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Breaking the Fever:
A New Construct for Regulating
Overtreatment
Isaac D. Buck*
The Department of Justice's ("DOJ") current theory of overtreatment
regulation - and, in fact, all of the prominent amount of medical
necessity-based health care fraud enforcement - adopts the argument
that providers are violating the False Claims Act when they submit bills to
the federal government for care they administered that is not medically
necessary. Besides stoking the ire of the provider community, this
regulatory strategy is susceptible to inefficiency, imprecision, and - as I
have argued before overuse. Whether a procedure was medically
necessary can be a highly difficult question to answer, one easily swayed
by clinically-complex details, and one made murkier by clinical and
geographic variation, Medicare's often outdated andlor inaccurate
coverage determinations, and overtreatment's settlement-based regulatory
regime that features few trials. This strategy can stifle innovation and
arrest the naturalevolution of the standard of care.
Given these difficulties, and aware of the imminent cost challenges
facing the Medicare program, this Article presents a proposal that seeks to
improve the efficiency and intellectual honesty of overtreatment regulation
by advocatingfor an explicit shift in the focus of enforcementfrom medical
necessity to excess utilization. Instead of targetingproviders and hospitals
for a contraventionof Medicare's medical necessity determination during a
Copyright © 2015 Isaac D. Buck. Assistant Professor, Mercer University School
of Law; Juris Doctor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Master of Bioethics,
University of Pennsylvania; Bachelor of Arts, Miami University (Ohio). I owe a debt of
gratitude to the participants, readers, and organizers of the 2014 Works-In-Progress
and New Scholars Panels at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools annual
meeting and at the 2014 University of Kentucky Emerging Ideas Conference, where I
presented earlier versions of this paper. Thanks especially to Jennifer Bard, Kathy
Cerminara, Nicole Huberfeld, Joan Krause, and Thad Pope for their helpful comments
on previous versions of this draft.
Thanks to Michelle, Audrey, and Lucy. As always, any errors or omissions are my own.
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particularepisode of care, this proposal submits that the DOJ would be
better served to pursue providers who, over the course of a year, provide
"too much" care when compared to similarly-situated peer providers.
Using peer providers' clinical behaviors as a comparative legal standard
would clarify the harm that overtreatment regulationseeks to prevent, and
relying on an accumulation of data would ensure that those who are
pursued by the DOJ are those who are the most responsiblefor America's
overtreatmentproblem.
Besides freeing the DOJ's attorneys from the thorny arguments that
characterize medical necessity-based fraud cases, repositioning clinical
expertise with providers, and deemphasizing Medicare's unpredictable
coverage determinations,this shift would allow the DOJ to take advantage
of the regulatory bonus of "cascaded retreat," where providers self-adjust
their behavior to avoid investigation.Further,building on previous works,
this construct would ensure the enforcement mechanism would avoid those
comparatively innocuous cases in which innovators minimally diverge
from a bureaucratic reimbursement or coverage standard. Most
importantly, it would seek to finally provide a powerful incentive to
American providers to "do less" without robbing doctors of their highlyvalued autonomy or harming Medicare's respectable quality of care. This
would provide a long-awaited counterbalance to the considerable
incentives that encourage providers to constantly provide more care in a
time offiscal cliffs and budget crises.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2011, it was John Dempsey Hospital ("Dempsey"), a 174-bed
component of the University of Connecticut Health Center, that was
in the news for allegedly administering computerized tomography
("CT") scans at a rate well above the national average. 2 Specifically,
physicians at Dempsey were allegedly administering chest
"combination scans" 3 - examinations that feature two different scans,
the first without contrast and a second with contrast to "help make
parts of the body stand out more clearly"4 - at nearly ten times the
national average. 5 And for patients with abdominal afflictions, 72% of
patients allegedly received these double combination scans at
Dempsey - easily outpacing the national average of 19%.6

1 University of Connecticut Health Center -

John Dempsey Hospital, U.S. NEWS &

http:/health.usnews.com/best-hospitats/area/ct/university-of-connecticuthealth-center-john-dempsey-hospital-6160215 (last visited Aug. 3, 2014); see also About
Us, UCoNN HEALTH, httpJ/www.uchc.eduL/about/index.html (last modified Dec. 8, 2011).
2 See Lisa Chedekel, UConn's Dempsey Hospital off the Charts in Controversial "Double
CT Scan" Use, CONN. HEALTH I-TEAM (Jan. 28, 2011), httpJ/c-hit.org/2011/01/28/
uconns dempsey-hospital off the charts/ [hereinafter Hospital off the Charts[; see also
Julie Appleby & Jordan Rau, Many Hospitals Overuse Double CT Scans, Data Show, WASH.
POST (June 18, 2011), httpi/www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/manyhospitals-overuse-double-ct-scans-data-shows/2011/06/16/AGvpTAaHstory.html.
3 See "Combination" or "Double" CT Scans of the Chest, Nw. MED., http://www.
nmh.org/nm/quality-combination-double-ct-scan-of-chest (last visited Aug. 3, 2014)
(noting that "[clontrast shouldn't be used if it is not needed. Most of the time,
radiologists can get a good picture of the chest by just taking a CT scan without
contrast").
4 Chedekel, Hospital off the Charts, supra note 2.
5 Id. The 2011 report noted that, for patients who presented to Dempsey in need
of chest CT scans, 48% received combination scans in 2008; the national average for
chest combination CT scans was 5%. Id.
6 See id.
WORLD REPORT,
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Unlike some other instances of overtreatment, excess combination
scans can subject the patient to clearly identifiable harm; in addition
to the extra cost to payers and patients for the added scan,
administering combination scans exposes patients to large doses of
radiation. 7 Clinically, there are few legitimate reasons to perform a
combination scan. 8 Health experts have noted that providers "without
radiologists on staff may be doing the double scans just to make sure
they get a full package of information before sending a patient home, "9
but the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") has flatly
noted that combination scans for the chest are "usually not
appropriate.' 10
What makes an excess combination scan rate legally relevant is the
fact that hospitals administering combination scans earn more in
reimbursement from the Medicare program" than those that
administer just one CT scan to a patient. When a provider or entity
administers health care services that are not medically necessary, the
care may implicate health care fraud and abuse laws. With no other
administrative regulations that speak to the amount of combination
scans that are appropriate - indeed, "Medicare doesn't restrict the use
of double scans or penalize those who perform lots of them"'12 - the
regulation of excess health care is an "all or nothing" proposition.
Excessive care is either legitimate or fraudulent; excess, by itself, does
not seem to be deliberately regulated by any calibrated legal or
administrative approach. 13
7 See "Combination" or "Double" CT Scans of the Chest, supra note 3. Indeed,
radiation exposure from a combination scan is "700 times higher than for a simple
chest x-ray," and for abdominal tests, "the radiation dose is comparable to that of
approximately 400 chest x-rays." Chedekel, Hospital off the Charts, supra note 2.
Notably, one CT scan has been shown to "triple the risk of later developing brain
cancer or leukemia." Jane E. Brody, Personal Health: Medical Radiation Soars, with
Risks Often Overlooked, N.Y. TIMES WELL BLOG, (Aug. 21, 2012, 4:02 PM),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/medical-radiation-soars-with-risks-oftenoverlooked/.
8 See Appleby & Rau, supra note 2; see also D.J. Brenner, Minimising Medically
Unwarranted Computed Tomography Scans, 41 ANNALS OF THE ICRP, nos. 3-4, 2012 at
161, 162 (noting that double CT scans double the dose of radiation administered to
the patient "without any concomitant increase in the information accrued").
9 Id.
10 See

Chedekel, Hospital off the Charts, supra note 2.
I1 See Appleby & Rau, supra note 2.
12 Id.
13 The

application of American fraud and abuse laws available to federal
prosecutors, and penalties imposed, hinge on the intent of the actor, not harm to the
public fisc. See, e.g., United States v. Lorenzo, 768 F. Supp. 1127, 1131, 1133 (E.D. Pa.
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Dempsey became aware of its excess rate of combination scans after
an internal review was completed in 2010; 14 by the spring of 2013, the
hospital "reduced the rate of double scans of the chest to below one
percent"' 5 from its nearly 50% rate after a "concerted effort" through
education and new training. 16 The chair of radiology, Dr. Douglas
Fellows, when discussing the excessive rate of combination scans in
2008, noted that "[il t [was]n't that they [physicians and emergency
room personnel] were doing anything for the wrong reasons - it's
just that they were trained years ago."' 17 No health care fraud action
followed the excessive combination scan rate, and where billed,
Medicare paid for each of the combination scans that Dempsey
administered; in an era of aggressive enforcement of health care
fraud, 18 by escaping a federal fraud investigation, Dempsey was one of
the lucky ones.
The Dempsey story is one illustrative example of the modern
challenge of overtreatment in American health care. As a class,
American providers and hospitals - generally incentivized to provide
more care - administer too much care, and compounding the
problem, too much of that care is too expensive. 19 As a result,
taxpayers and patients spend much more money on health care than
citizens of any other country in the world.20 With the United States
1991) (regarding a False Claims Act penalty that totaled more than $18 million for a
dentist who defrauded the government for $130,719).
14 See Chedekel, Hospital off the Charts, supra note 2. Dempsey's safety rating for a
2013 Consumer Reports issue was affected by its combination scan rate. See William
Weir, John Dempsey Hospital Ranks Last in Consumer Reports List, Says Information
Outdated, HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 28, 2013), http://articles.courant.com/2013-0328/health/hc-dempsey-ranking-20130327 1 consumer-reports-list-hospital-comparehospital-consumer-assessment.
15 Lisa Chedekel, Dempsey Hospital Makes Progress Reducing Double CT Scans,
CTWATCHDOG.COM (Apr. 4, 2013), http://ctwatchdog.com/health/dempsey-hospitalmakes-progress-reducing-double-ct-scans.
16 See id.
17

Id.

18 The number of health care fraud investigations has increased in recent years.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Departments of Justice and
Health and Human Services Announce Record-Breaking Recoveries Resulting from
Joint Efforts to Combat Health Care Fraud (Feb. 26, 2014), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/02/20140226a.html (noting the numerous
records that were set in health care fraud prosecutions in 2013).
19 See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., WHY Is HEALTH SPENDING IN
THE UNITED STATES So HIGH? (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/
49084355.pdf (reporting statistics that suggest that health spending is "much higher"
than other OECD countries).
20 See id. at 1.

1266

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 48:1261

spending one of every six dollars of its gross domestic product
("GDP") on health care, 2' and Medicare facing a ballooning number of
beneficiaries, 22 attorneys at the Department of Justice ("DOJ") have
scrambled to employ their anti-fraud tools in an effort to return money
back to Medicare's trust fund. As a consequence, stories like
23
Dempsey's often end with a fraud settlement.
But the DOJ's haphazard efforts have lacked thoughtfulness and
calibration. Besides possibly stifling innovation, potentially slowing
the development of the standard of care, 24 and building a regulatory
regime susceptible to overenforcement, 25 the DOJ has lacked a
cohesive and coherent construct for regulating and penalizing
overtreatment. As I have previously argued, by using the False Claims
Act ("FCA") as its chief tool for the regulation of overtreatment, the
DOJ has relied on a blunt tool for a multifaceted challenge; it has
created a regulatory regime with little stratification of wrongdoing,
26
resulting in cascading settlements lacking in precedent and order.
This regulatory structure is unlikely to change, particularly
entrenched due to: (1) the lack of political will to either amend the
FCA or otherwise cabin it to prevent or limit it from widely applying
to health care fraud; (2) Congress' general ambivalence toward doing
anything that may be characterized as being "soft" on fraud or crime;
and (3) perhaps the most important reason, the undeniably lucrative

21 See Shirley S. Wang, U.S. Health Spending: One of These Things Not Like Others,
WALL ST. J. ECON. BLOG (Jul. 23, 2013, 2:05 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/
2013/07/23/u-s-health-spending-one-of-these-things-not-like-others/.
22 The major challenge for Medicare's future cost is a result of its upcoming
population explosion, with the aging of the Baby Boomer generation. See generally
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE STATE OF AGING AND HEALTH IN
AMERICA 2013, at ii (2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/features/agingandhealthI

state-of.aging-and-health in america_2013.pdf ("The growth in the number and
proportion of older adults is unprecedented in the history of the United States. Two
factors - longer life spans and aging baby boomers - will combine to double the
population of Americans aged 65 or older during the next 25 years to about 72
million. By 2030, older adults will account for roughly 20% of the U.S. population.").
23 See generally Isaac D. Buck, Caring Too Much: Misapplying the False Claims Act
to Target Overtreatment, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 463 (2013) [hereinafter Caring Too Much]
(recounting many instances of the DOJ's zealous pursuit of settlements in medical
fraud cases).
24 See id. at 499-501.
25 See Isaac D. Buck, Enforcement Overdose: Health Care Fraud Regulation in an Era
of Overcriminalization and Overtreatment, 74 MD. L. REV. 259, 263-64 (2015)
[hereinafter Enforcement Overdose].
26 See Buck, Caring Too Much, supranote 23, at 469.
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return on investment of health care fraud enforcement for the federal
27
government.
Granted, the solution to this challenge could be an administrative
one - that is, CMS and Health and Human Services ("HHS") could
establish a mechanism
by which they fine providers or entities that are
"overutilizers." 28 CMS could have automatically imposed a fine on
Dempsey, for instance, for exceeding an acceptable range of
combination CT scans. Indeed, Medicare itself could simply refuse to
pay for care that is excessive; reimbursement policy could take a more
intentional and constricting tack, but - for many of the same
structural reasons - Medicare remains unlikely to do so. It makes
intuitive sense to elect a softer, more granular tool than the FCA to
prevent overtreatment, but such a shift seems doubtful. As a result, the
primary challenge presented by regulating overtreatment is in building
an orderly framework within this larger environment of disorder.
Within this environment, the "second-best" solution may be to
recalibrate and retarget the investigation of overtreatment to improve
its consistency and accuracy. Indeed, a gap exists between current
overtreatment legal theory - which almost completely relies upon the
allegation that care at issue was not medically necessary - and the
reality of the overtreatment problem - which is characterized by
cumulative overutilization, for one reason or another.2 9 Indeed, at
27 See Buck, Enforcement Overdose, supra note 25, at 263-64.
28 Indeed, section 3025 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA")
penalizes hospitals for readmission rates. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3025, 124 Stat. 119, 408-13 (2010) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2012)); Readmissions Reduction Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/
AcutelnpatientPPSReadmissions-Reduction-Program.html (last modified Aug. 4, 2014). In
2014, 2,225 hospitals were penalized. CMS: The 2,225 Hospitals That Will Pay Readmissions
Penalties Next Year, DAILY BRIEFING (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/
2013/08/05/cms-2225-hospitals-will-pay-readmissions-penalties-next-year. Nevertheless,
there are no specific provisions in the ACA that seek to control or limit the overall amount
of health care services within the doctor-patient relationship.
29 Overtreatment cases center on the medical necessity of a procedure, often to the
confusion of the targeted provider. See, e.g., Lisa Schencker, Dignity Health Pays $37
Million in False-Claims Action, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.
modernhealthcare.com/article/20141030/NEWS/310309940
(noting a settlement
entered into by Dignity Health for improper and medically unnecessary hospital
admissions, with Dignity noting that the "billing disputes" at issue "reflect widespread
confusion in the health care industry on unclear federal standards for approving
coverage of patient admissions"). However, the challenge of overtreatment itself is a
much broader issue, especially if up to 30% of health care in the United States is spent
on wasted services. See Editorial, Waste in the Health Care System, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
10,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/1 i/opinion/waste-in-the-health-care-
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Dempsey, the harm was not that certain combination CTs were not
medically necessary, but instead, the harm was Dempsey's cumulative
excessive administration of combination CTs. It is the excess, not the
demonstrated lack of necessity, which harms the Medicare program
and should be the chief target of overtreatment regulation.
This piece advocates for a regulatory change by presenting a new,
but seemingly simple, construct of overtreatment regulation.
Specifically, this piece recommends that the DOJ reconceive of
overtreatment regulation - from the targets of its investigations to the
legal arguments it espouses as primarily pursuing providers
responsible not for unnecessary care based on some governmentestablished medical necessity standard, but instead, targeting those
providers responsible for excessive cumulative utilization compared to
other, similarly-situated peer providers. Indeed, the challenge in
reigning in government spending in the Medicare program has less to
do with preventing the filing of per se false claims with the
government, and more to do with reordering incentives so
participating providers limit volume and cost.30 Medicare has been
unable to slow cost growth due to a complex relationship with cost
control and its strong protection of clinical autonomy. As a result, an
opening has appeared for the DOJ to use its regulatory tools - albeit
in a more transparent, calibrated, and perhaps limited way than in the
past - to explicitly limit rising expense by targeting the excess
utilization of health services. Such a shift would not only allow the
DOJ to reach situations like those posed by the Dempsey Hospital
discussion, but would force overtreatment regulation into a much
needed new era.
A number of advantages come with this nuanced shift. First,
reconceiving of the harm from unnecessary care to excessive utilization
frees regulators from the thorny arguments surrounding clinical
practice, scientific advances, and patient harm. Instead, they can focus
on the true threat of overtreatment - overutilization, and, relatedly,
excess cost. 3 1 DOJ attorneys would no longer have to dwell in artery
occlusion percentages or qualify the severity of an adverse cardiac

system.html; Delos Cosgrove et al., A CEO Checklist for High-Value Health Care 4
(June 5, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.iom.edul-/media/Files/
Perspectives-Files/2012/Discussion-Papers/CEOHighValueChecklist.pdf.
30 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, The Perfect Storm of Overutilization,
299 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2789, 2790 (2008).
31 See Tara Parker-Pope, Overtreatment is Taking a Harmful Toll, N.Y TiMEs WELL BLOG
(Aug. 27, 2012, 2:37 PM), httpi/well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/overtreatment-istaking-a-harmful-toll/ (documenting instances of wasteful, costly care).
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event; instead, utilization rates per patient would drive the analysis.
Second, and relatedly, this shift would give regulators a well-defined
and quantifiable measure with which to discern harm to the federal
health care programs, always granting them a defensible focus of
investigation. Third, by setting peer-based comparison as the basis for
liability, the enforcement framework would reposition clinical control
back within the medical community, ending the clashes between
government regulators and clinicians over the worthwhileness of a
particular medical procedure - a battle, which for various reasons,
produces few real winners. Those providers who come under the
DOJ's microscope would be those who are the most out of step with
their peers, not those most out of step with Medicare's medical
necessity standard. Most importantly perhaps, breaking from decades
of legal incentives for providers to do more, this new conception of
overtreatment regulation clearly incentivizes providers to do less
without robbing them of their highly valued autonomy. Maintaining
this autonomy but encouraging less care seeks to both slow spiraling
cost and maintain the quality of care administered to Medicare's nearly
fifty million beneficiaries. 32
In order to fully detail the proposal, this analysis will proceed in five
parts. Part I explores structural characteristics that impact Medicare's
ability to control costs - limiting its ability to provide a satisfactory
regulatory answer to overtreatment. 33 Part II presents evidence
demonstrating the dawn of a new data-driven and transparent era
regarding costs in Medicare. 34 Part III summarizes overtreatment
investigations with different postures in an effort to make clear key
considerations in fraud and abuse regulation today.35 Part IV presents
the solution of encouraging government prosecutors to focus on
providers engaged in excess utilization and summarizes practical
advantages. 36 Finally, Part V presents a legal and policy-based defense
of the new regime, as health care fraud enforcement seeks solutions to
37
Medicare's seemingly intractable cost crisis.

32 See Total Number of Medicare Beneficiaries, 2012, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,

http://kff.org/medicare/state-indicator/total-medicare-beneficiaries/
26, 2014).
33 See infra Part I.
34 See infra Part It.
35 See infra Part 1I.
36 See infra Part IV.
37 See infra Part V.
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DEAD END: MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT POLICY

Medicare, by and through its administrators at CMS, plays a major
role in clinical standard-setting within American medicine. By its
medical necessity determinations and more formal national coverage
determination ("NCD") and, where relevant, local coverage
determination ("LCD") processes, Medicare and its contractors set
clinical standards for participating providers by establishing
reimbursement policy. 38 These determinations go beyond the
boundaries of Medicare; in addition to setting reimbursement for the
program, Medicare's coverage determinations influence private
insurers.3 9 Indeed, the program's "reimbursement and coverage
policies have been widely adopted by private insurers and other public
programs," and "many private insurers follow Medicare's lead in
approving coverage of new medical technologies,"40 making it the
"country's preeminent organization for the assessment
of health
technology."41
This standard-setting function, while powerful, is far from perfect,
and is impacted by two types of structural complexities within the
program. These structural complexities have hampered Medicare's
ability to control costs. And both dilute the accuracy and potency of
Medicare's standards.
First, Medicare's ability to set accurate clinical standards is impacted
by its complicated relationship and history with cost control. Most
basically, statutory and historical restraints on the Medicare program
prevent it from fully taking cost into account when determining
38 See Michael J. DeBoer, Medicare Coverage Policy and Decision Making, Preventive
Services, and Comparative Effectiveness Research Before and After the Affordable Care
Act, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 493, 520-31 (2012) (documenting the coverage
process, including the role of the Medicare Evidence Development and Coverage
Advisory Committee).
39 See Jacqueline Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost: Medicare Decisions, Transparency
and Public Trust, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 15 (2010) [hereinafter The Hidden Role of Cost].
40

PAUL N. VAN DE WATER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, MEDICARE CHANGES

CAN COMPLEMENT HEALTH REFORM 3 (2008), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/731-08health.pdf; see Gillian Mohney, Eye Lifts - Fine Line Between Cosmetic and
Therapeutic, ABC NEWS (May 31, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/
2013/05/3 l/eye-lifts-fine-line-between-cosmetic-and-therapeutic/ (noting how other
insurance companies follow Medicare's lead on determining whether a procedure is
medically necessary or not).
41 Peter J. Neumann & James D. Chambers, Medicare's Enduring Struggle to Define
"Reasonable and Necessary" Care, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1775, 1775 (2012) ("Its
decisions to cover and pay for medical technology can have profound consequences
for patients' access to therapies, physicians' treatment options, and the fiscal wellbeing of the program.").
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whether to cover a new procedure for its beneficiaries, ultimately
producing, as Professor Jacqueline Fox has noted, "distorted" coverage
results. 42 In this way, Medicare differs from private payers; where
private payers can substantially impact clinical practice by their refusal
to pay for non-medically-necessary procedures,43 or by limiting their
networks, Medicare has few levers within its reimbursement scheme
that it can engage to dissuade providers from administering
overtreatment.
Second, beyond the awkward cost issue within Medicare generally,
its own formal NCD and LCD process is influenced by a bias toward
providing coverage for new and expensive technologies and services.
The standard-setting process-based constraints pressure Medicare into
covering more procedures and products, both in number and price,
which undoubtedly affects its ability to slow rising costs within the
program. As a result, the coverage standard itself - even when
enforced - may not be reflective of the most accurate and deliberative
process. Both of these phenomena are presented below.
A.

Costly Concerns

When it comes to cost control, and as so aptly presented by
Professor Nicolas Bagley, 44 for all of its success, America's seminal
public insurance program of Medicare suffers from chronic and critical
design flaws. As many Americans know, the program is politically
popular45 but financially troubled, 46 particularly because it has so

42 See Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn't Worked,
101 GEO. L. REV. 519, 549-50 (2013) (providing a historical analysis of Medicare's cost

challenges); Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost, supra note 39, at 15.
43 See Linda A. Bergthold, Medical Necessity: Do We Need It?, 14 HEALTH AFF. 180,
181-83 (1995) ("Medical necessity has become a major tool for allocating health care
resources in a time of increasing costs."); see, e.g., Medical Necessity, ILL. DEP'T. OF INS.,
http://insurance.illinois.gov/Healthlnsurance/Medical-Necessity.asp (last visited Aug.
11, 2014) ("Insurance companies and HMOs exclude coverage for treatment that is
not medically necessary because they do not want to extend benefits for unnecessary
treatment or for care that might be potentially dangerous or harmful to their
members.").
44 See Bagley, supra note 42, at 541-44.
45 Cf. Seniors Most Likely to Say Medicare Is Working Well, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(Mar. 12, 2013), http://kff.org/medicare/slide/seniors-most-likely-to-say-medicare-isworking-well/ (noting that 80% of individuals aged sixty-five or over responded to a
recent poll that "Medicare is working well," compared to just 60% of all Americans).
46 Cf. Projected Medicare Spending, 2013-2023, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (July 15,
2013), http://kff.org/medicare/slide/projected-medicare-spending-2013-2023/ (noting
that Medicare spending is projected to increase 182% between 2013 and 2023).
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limited its ability to control costs. 47 As currently constituted, it has
largely left the implementation of various cost control up efforts to the
participating providers "at the bedside," 48 apparently expecting
49
physicians to act directly against their own financial interests.
For nearly fifty years, Medicare has ceded much of its costconstraining power to the medical profession, and as a result,
throughout Medicare's existence, providers have enjoyed largelyunchallenged autonomy through fee-for-service reimbursement with
little incentive to rein in costs.

50

Waves of cost control efforts have

proven unsuccessful, often due to political motives. 51 Today, Medicare
resembles a public option insurance plan for the elderly, but has
imposed few restrictions on the physicians who treat its
beneficiaries. 52 And as a bulk purchaser of health care services,
Medicare has failed to use much of its considerable leverage 53 to hold
down the price of doctor visits, pharmaceutical drugs, 54 or surgeries. 55

47 See Bagley, supra note 42, at 527 ("Structuring Medicare as an entitlement to
indemnification keyed to judgments of medical necessity meant that Congress
surrendered direct control over the size of Medicare funding.").
48 Id. at 521 (noting that physicians have remained in control of the program
throughout its existence).
49 See id. at 543 ("Medical societies have not assumed the wished-for leadership
role

in promoting cost-conscious care,

and why would

they?

They're trade

associations, not regulators.").
50 See David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social
Norms, and the Trust "Reposed in the Workmen," 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531, 537 (2001)
("Providers decided which services were required, where they would be delivered, and
how much they would cost .... Medicare exercised little or no oversight over the
services that were provided, the amounts that were billed, and the quality of the
medical care that was delivered."); Eleanor Kinney, Medicare Coverage DecisionMaking and Appeal Procedures: Can Process Meet the Challenge of New Medical
Technology?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461, 1466 (2003) (noting that "the designers
deliberately maintained the fee-for-service payment methods for all providers, thereby
seeding cost inflation, to ensure the participation of reluctant providers").
51 See, e.g., Virgil Dickson, CMS Backs Off Major Changes to Medicare Part D,
MODERN HEALTHCARE (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20140310/NEWS/303109971 (documenting that the Obama administration "backed
away from major changes" that was "intended to control costs").
52 See Bagley, supra note 42, at 521, 527. Different from public option plans,
which limit costs because of bargaining power and sheer size, Medicare does not take
cost into account.
53 See Bagley, supra note 42, at 551 (noting that Medicare does not negotiate price
terms and also noting that Medicare fails to "reliably enforce NCDs"); see also id. at
567 ("Unsurprisingly, Medicare has spawned an enormous amount of fraud and
abuse.... Congress... has consistently declined to give CMS the resources it would
need to do its job well.").
54 An example of a congressional action that has contributed to the spiraling cost
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Unsurprisingly, these design flaws make Medicare particularly
susceptible to generating a large cumulative amount of unnecessary
care, which in turn, places its long-term financial sustainability in
question. As Professor Eleanor Kinney has noted:
[Since the inception of the program,] the structure and
financing of Medicare and private health insurance plans
[have] contributed to excessive utilization of health care
services ....

[Bieneficiaries [have been] insulated from the

financial consequences of their decisions to use health care
services and provider payment methods [have been] based on
incurred costs and charges which encouraged inefficiencies in
care delivery.56
It is Congress that has created this situation for Medicare, largely perhaps ironically - by historical design. 57 Not wanting to scare
problem within Medicare is the imposition of a limit on Medicare that prevents it from
being able to negotiate prices with drug companies. This prohibition has been in place
since the passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, and largely affects Medicare Part D - but also impacts
physician services under Part B. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
Throughout the last couple of years, the debate surrounding Medicare's ability to
negotiate prices with drug companies has come in and out of the public
consciousness. Some say "it could save billions of dollars annually." Editorial,
Medicare: A Plan B for Part D, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/
2012/dec/21/opinion/la-ed-medicare-prescription-drug-negotiated-prices-20121221.
Indeed, "simply giving Medicare's low-income beneficiaries the same discount under
Medicaid would save $116 billion over 10 years." Editorial, Let Medicare Negotiate
Drug Prices: Our View, USA TODAY (Apr. 20, 2014, 5:50 PM EDT),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/04/20/medicare-part-d-prescriptiondrug-prices-negotiate-editorials-debates/7943745/.
55 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Patients' Costs Skyrocket; Specialists' Incomes Soar, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/health/patients-costsskyrocket-specialists-incomes-soar.html (presenting examples of surgery's costs that
have grown wildly, and that "Medicare has not reduced payments for many
procedures that now take far less time than when they were invented, because of
improvements in efficiency or technology").
56 Kinney, supra note 50, at 1467.
57 See Bagley, supra note 42, at 553 ("The enacting Congress's painstaking efforts
to avoid interfering in physician treatment decisions, Congress's refusal in the fortyeight years since to explicitly authorize the consideration of costs, and a deep societal
distaste for government rationing all lend considerable force to the intuition that
Congress has never authorized Medicare to consider cost in making coverage
determinations."); see also DeBoer, supra note 38, at 512 (noting that "[t]hese
payment methods helped to attract providers to the program, but they also
contributed to overutilization of health care services, promoted provider inefficiencies,
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doctors away from initially enrolling in the program, Medicare
sweetened the deal for participating providers.58 Participation in the
program quickly proved quite lucrative for a number of providers, and
cost inflation rapidly began in the early years of Medicare. 59 That
inflation has continued 60

largely unabated and unresolved -

for five

decades.
Today, where it has attempted to fill gaps by providing day-to-day
regulatory guidance, Congress has failed to provide agency resources
to oversee enforcement of the regulations. 61 Decades since its original
construction, the costs62 of the growing 63 program have forced the

federal government to consider radical changes to its structure. 64 And
with the exploding number of new beneficiaries enrolling in the
program over the next fifteen years, 65 Medicare's cost pressures will
likely only intensify. 66 Debate surrounding how the program should
and produced dramatic increases in the prices and costs of health care").
58 See Kinney, supra note 50, at 1466; see also Nancy-Ann DeParle, Medicare at 40:
A Mid-Life Crisis?, 7J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 70, 75-77 (2004) ("Medicare's creators
worried that physicians would refuse to participate in the program, so they bent over
backward to make it simple: physicians sent bills for their usual and customary fees to
patients, and money flowed back form the government.").
59 See Kinney, supra note 50, at 1467 ("Immediately upon implementation, the
Medicare program generated enormous demand for health care services, and thus
created sharp and continuing increases in the cost of health care."); see also DeParle,
supra note 58, at 77.
60 See Editorial, Health Costs and History, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703746604574461610985243
066 (noting the cost growth and inaccuracy of early cost projections for Medicare).
61 See Bagley, supra note 42, at 529 ("Congress deprived federal administrators of
the conventional roster of legal and management tools typically used to control
frontline bureaucrats."); id. at 551 ("There is no indication that CMS evaluates its
contractors on whether they enforce their coverage determinations - or that CMS
would even have the resources to do so.").
62 Medicare cost American taxpayers $586 billion in 2013, and is projected to cost
more than $1 trillion starting in 2022. See Projected Medicare Spending, 2013-2023,
supra note 46.
63 In 2013, about 52 million Americans were on Medicare. See Medicare: The
Essentials, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/slideshow/medicare-the-essentials/
(last visited May 28, 2014).
64 See, e.g., Steve Vernon, The Ryan Medicare Plan: A Critical Look, CBS NEWS
(Aug. 31, 2012, 7:35 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-ryan-medicare-plan-acritical-look/ (suggesting a voucher-based Medicare plan).
65 By 2025, the number of beneficiaries enrolled in the Medicare program is
projected to top 73 million Americans, and by 2035, more than 86 million Americans
are projected to be in the program. See Medicare Enrollment, 1970-2035, KAISER FAMILY

FOUND. (July 15, 2013), http://kff.org/medicare/slide/medicare-enrollment-1970-2035/.
66 Cf. Projected Medicare Spending, 2013-2023, supra note 46 (forecasting that

20151

Breaking the Fever

1275

change has exposed the conflicts that exist between individualism and
utilitarianism, between taxpayers and patients, and between law and
medicine. 67 On those counts up to this point, Medicare has chosen
individuals, patients, and medicine68 but not without
consequences.
The one inflection point where Medicare could seek to reverse rising
expense is to explicitly consider cost when deciding which types of
procedures and products it will cover. Much like health management
organizations ("HMOs") in the 1980s and early 1990s 69 and private

insurance companies throughout modern America's health care
delivery system, Medicare could constrict the type and nature of
services for which it reimburses. Less drastically, Medicare could pay
only for procedures and services that are cost-effective, using its ability
to set reimbursement rates to try and influence provider behavior. 70 As
Professor Fox has noted, this would allow beneficiaries and citizens to
engage in a robust debate about what types of procedures are
71
worthwhile.
But neither of these suggestions has been implemented. Indeed,
72
unlike private insurance companies, due to statutory prohibition,
Medicare cannot consider the cost-effectiveness of a procedure in
Medicare spending will exceed $1 trillion per year by 2023).
67 See Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Ken Thorpe, The Current Medicare Debate Will Not
Solve the Program's Problems, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/201 3/02/1 2/the-current-medicare-debate-will-not-solve-theprograms-problems/ (noting that changing Medicare requires "structural reforms"); David
Jackson, Obama-Romney-Ryan Medicare Debate Takes Surprising Turn, USA TODAY (Aug.
19, 2012, 1:14 PM), http//content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/08/
obama-romney-medicare-debate-takes-a-turn/l#.VH4z9L64100 (referencing the conflict
during the 2012 presidential election over the future of Medicare).
68 See Bagley, supra note 42, at 533 (noting that Congress has "struck the balance
decisively in favor of physician autonomy").
69 See Peter Passell, Backlash; in Medicine, Government Rises Again, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 7, 1997), http://www.nytimes.coni/1997/12/07/weekinreview/backlash-inmedicine-government-rises-again.html; see also Maxim L. Pinkovskiy, The Impact of
the Managed Care Backlash on Health Care Costs: Evidence from State Regulation of
Managed Care Cost Containment Practices 1-2 (Oct. 17, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), availableat http://economics.mit.edu/files/8448.
70 See Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost, supra note 39, at 47-49 (suggesting that
Medicare use cost in coverage determinations).
71 See id.
72 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012) (preventing federal interference in the practice of
medicine); see also Jacqueline Fox, Medicare Should, But Cannot, Consider Cost: Legal
Impediments to a Sound Policy, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 577, 584-95 (2005) [hereinafter
Medicare Should Consider Cost] (providing historical and legal background to the
prohibition on cost consideration).
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making its coverage determinations. 73 Even though CMS's predecessor
tried to explicitly consider cost in coverage determinations in the late
1980s, 74 CMS is still prevented from explicitly reviewing the costeffectiveness of services. This is likely due to the historical and
statutory structure of the program, 75 the deep distrust that comes with
"too much" government regulation of health care, 76 and a concern that
physicians will no longer participate in the program if not given
nearly-complete autonomy, 77 leading to congressional acts that have
repealed cost-cutting measures.7 8
73 See Bagley, supra note 42, at 526 ("Because physicians' prevailing conception of
medical necessity was (and is) cost blind, eligibility for Medicare payments depended
not at all on the costs of the treatment in question.").
74 See Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical Services
Coverage Decisions That Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg. 4302, 4303
(proposed Jan. 30, 1989) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 400, 405) (noting that the
Health Care Finance Administration, CMS's predecessor, tried to change its
reimbursement formula to consider cost-effectiveness); see also Fox, The Hidden Role
of Cost, supra note 39, at 19.
75 See Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost, supra note 39, at 11-14.
76 This distrust affected the debate and implementation of the ACA, characterized by
President Obama's adversaries as a "government takeover of health care." See, e.g., DAVID
GRATZER, WHY OBAMA'S GOVERNMENT TAKEOVER OF HEALTH CARE WILL BE A DISASTER

(2009) (arguing that the Affordable Care Act would harm American health care); Emily
Miller, Editorial, Obamacare Is a Trojan Horsefor Government-Run Health Care Starting in
2015, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/
mar/19/miller-obamacare-a-trojan-horse-for-government-run/ ("Mr. Obama's objective
has always been to entrench the doomed law into our lives so that it would lead to a
government takeover of the whole health care system. This maniacal plan is working.");
Avik Roy, Government Takeover: White House Forces ObamacareInsurers to Cover Unpaid
Patients at a Loss, FORBES (Dec. 14, 2013, 7:42 AM), http://www.forbes.comsites/theapothecary/2013/12/14/government-takeover-white-house-forces-obamacareinsurers-to-cover-unpaid-patients-at-a-loss/ ("If Obamacare wasn't a government
takeover of the health insurance industry, then what it is now?").
Echoing this concern, allegations of death panels, claims of socialized medicine, and
calls to "keep your government hands off my Medicare" began shortly after debate
began in 2009. See Timothy Noah, The Medicare-Isn't-GovernmentMeme, SLATE (Aug.
5, 2009, 2:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/prescriptions/
2009/08/the.medicareisntgovernment-meme.html; Philip Rucker, Sen. DeMint of S.C.
Is Voice of Opposition to Health-Care Reform, WASH. POST (Jul. 28, 2009), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/7/27/AR2009072703066_2.html.
These reactions to the ACA highlighted deep-seated distrust of governmental
involvement in health care, and largely steered the debate for the following five years,
limiting the amount of realistic options for reform. See generally Helen A. Halpin &
Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the Public Option, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1117
(2010) (noting how the public option became a main point of controversy).
77 See Bagley, supra note 42, at 557-58.
78 See Wesley Lowery, For 17th Time in II Years, Congress Delays Medicare
Reimbursement Cuts as Senate Passes "Doc Fix," WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2014),
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Even though cost may be considered behind the scenes, 79 there is
neither public debate surrounding, nor an explicit recognition that
cost concerns impact, coverage determinations.8 0 As Professor Fox has
argued, determinations resulting from the "reasonable and necessary"
language of the Medicare statute, 8 1 to NCDs, 82 to third-party coverage
conclusions,8 3 based upon medical necessity - that is, whether a
treatment was reasonable and necessary for the health of a beneficiary
- can be distorted. 84 Consequently, Medicare pays for expensive
surgeries that have limited utility; recent research has concluded that
"CMS is covering a number of interventions that do not appear to be
cost-effective." 8 5 Beyond failing to pay for only cost-effective care,
Medicare has also come under fire for paying for a growing number of
86
potentially cosmetic surgeries.
A growing chorus of scholars and clinicians has argued that CMS
should, in fact, take cost into consideration when crafting medical
necessity standards and coverage determinations. 87 However, Congress
http://www.washingtonpost.coVmblogs/post-politics/wp/2014/03/3 1/for-17th-time-in11-years-congress-delays-medicare-reimbursement-cuts-as-senate-passes-doc-fix/; see,
e.g., Protecting Access to Medicare of 2014, H.R. 4302, 113th Cong. § 101 (2014)
(updating the conversion factor to 0.0, thus undoing the sustainable growth rate
formula for another year).
79 See Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost, supra note 39, at 5 ("CMS often flatly denies
that cost impacts its specific decisions, yet its management continually stresses the
importance of cost control. As a result of these conflicting messages, and in light of
CMS's actual decisions, it has become an 'open secret' in health policy that CMS
considers cost when issuing NCDs.").
80 Id.

81 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y (West 2014) (laying out exclusions from Medicare
coverage).
82 See Medicare Coverage Determination Process, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/DeterminationProcess/ (last modified
Nov. 27, 2013).
83 See DeBoer, supra note 38, at 506 ("In the absence of national coverage policy,
regional or local Medicare administrative contractors make determinations of coverage
as to items and services.").
84 See Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost, supra note 39, at 7 (arguing that the failure to
consider cost in Medicare's coverage determinations "distorts" the process).
85 See James D. Chambers et al., Does Medicare Have an Implicit Cost-Effectiveness
Threshold?, 30 MED. DECISION MAKING E14, E17 (2010).
86 See Mohney, supra note 40 (noting the debate over whether Medicare should
pay for blepharoplasties (eyelid lift surgeries), and that eyelid lifts covered by
Medicare have experienced "a threefold increase since 2001," but nationwide, the total
number performed has dropped by 38%).
87 See SEAN R. TUNIS ET AL., URBAN INST., IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY OF
THE MEDICARE PROGRAM THROUGH COVERAGE POLICY 14 (2011), available at
http://healthreformgps.org/wp-content/uploads/Urban-nstitute-Medicare-Coverage-
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has not been motivated to change the process. 88 As a result, CMS is left
in an awkward position - charged with stewardship over America's
crown jewel public insurance program but with very little ability to
prevent it from traversing a fiscal cliff. It has become a passenger in a
runaway train without access to the brakes.
B.

"Reasonableand Necessary" and NCDs

Often, liability in cases based on allegations of overtreatment
depends largely upon where, exactly, the line lies between legitimate
and illegitimate care. In these cases, determining what is legal depends
upon what is medically necessary. 89 Where providers "on the ground"
differ from Medicare's medical necessity standards, a conflict of law
and medicine results - a conflict that, professional organizations will
unsurprisingly argue, should be resolved in favor of the individual
clinician's judgment. 90 That allegations of overtreatment can result in
August-2011.pdf ("CMS should be allowed to deny coverage and/or reduce the pricing
for technologies that provide health outcomes comparable to already covered, but less
costly, technologies."); Fox, Medicare Should Consider Cost, supra note 72, at 595-96;
see also Steven D. Pearson & Peter B. Bach, How Medicare Could Use Comparative
Effectiveness Research in Deciding on New Coverage and Reimbursement, 29 HEALTH AFF.
1796, 1796 (2010).
88 See Fox, Medicare Should Consider Cost, supra note 72, at 603-09.
89 As a result, this analysis - and the global suggestions posited here - focuses
solely on cases whose alleged fraudulent acts hinge on an analysis of whether a procedure
was medically necessary or not. Although interesting, cases in which providers and
entities brazenly defraud the federal government are not those on which this analysis
focuses. These include cases in which individuals open fake storefronts in Miami and bill
the federal government for care they never administered, "crooked" doctors "upcode" the
bill they send in for reimbursement, and pharmacists bill for brand-name drugs but fill
patients' prescriptions with generic alternatives. See Chris Parker, South FloridaIs Ground
Zero for

Medicare Fraud, MIAMI

NEW

TIMES

(May

2,

2013),

http://www.

miaminewtimes.com/2013-05-02/news/medicare-fraud-south-florida/full; see also Andrea
K. Walker, Medical Billing a Target of Fraud Investigations, BALT. SUN (jan. 12, 2012),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-01-12/health/bs-hs-umms-malnutrition-response-220120112 1 health-care-fraud-coding-billing; Authorities Crackdown on Major Medicare
Fraud In Detroit, KAISER HEALTH NEws (June 25, 2009), httpJ/www.
kaiserhealthnews.org/daily-reports/2009/une/25/more-fraud.aspx ("The scheme in Miami
allegedly used fake storefronts in an attempt to cheat Medicare out of $100 million.");
Twin-Brother PharmacistsAdmit Guilt in $1.5M Health Care Fraud,NJ.coM (Aug. 6, 2013),
http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2013/08/twin-brother pharmacists-admit-guilt in
15m healthcare fraud.html. These are clear cases of deceit, and the insights presented
here do not apply to these actors. Their prosecution and punishment are less doctrinally
challenging - and, of course, largely not responsible for the avalanche of cost challenges
facing Medicare.
90 See Richard I. Fogel et al., The Disconnect Between the Guidelines, the Appropriate
Use Criteria,and Reimbursement Coverage Decisions, 63 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 12, 14
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dramatic legal consequences for the providers targeted highlights the
importance of Medicare's medical necessity determination. 9 1 Still, this
important process has been described as being "maintained in
secrecy" 92 and "closeted." 93
By statutory design, Medicare provides scant guidance for clinicians.
In fact, the Medicare statute requires that:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any
Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or
control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which
medical services are provided, or over the selection, tenure, or
compensation of any officer or employee of any institution,
agency, or person providing health services; or to exercise any
supervision or control over the administration or operation of
any such institution, agency, or person. 94
Predictably, by ceding "any supervision or control" over the "practice
of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided,"

Medicare has limited its ability to control costs. 95 Beyond the general

prohibition of government involvement in medicine, Medicare's
standard-setting function also is statutorily-based. "[N]o payment may
be made ... for any expenses incurred for items or services which ...

are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of
illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body
member." 96 The "reasonable and necessary" language is not defined by
the statute, 97 but the requirement that a service be reasonable or

(2014).
91 See Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors' "Bad
Law" Claims Seriously, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 973, 1029 (2009) [hereinafter Regulating

Physician Behavior] (noting that providers subject to a fraud investigation suffer a
number of financial and reputational costs).
92 See Timothy P. Blanchard, "Medical Necessity" Determinations - A Continuing
HealthcarePolicy Problem, 37j. HEALTH L. 599, 604 (2004).
93 See Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost, supra note 39, at 50.
94 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2012).
95 Id.; see also William J. Scanlon, The Future of Medicare Hospital Payment, 25
HEALTH AFF. 70, 71 (2006) ("The program has also been reluctant to question the
value of services and whether some should be purchased at all, a reflection, perhaps,
of its historical mandate 'not to interfere in the practice of medicine."').
96 42 U.S.C.A. § 13 9 5y (West 2014).
97 See DeBoer, supra note 38, at 504-05 ("The Medicare statute does not define the
term 'reasonable and necessary' or specific criteria for making coverage
determinations.").
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necessary is the "major criterion for coverage of benefits" within the
98
Medicare program.
When providers submit the "CMS-1500 Form" - the form they use
to bill Medicare for an administered health care service - they must
certify that the services billed on the form "were medically indicated
and necessary for the health of the patient." 99 Where the provider
certifies as such, and Medicare pays for the service, but that service
was "not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of
illness or injury," then the certification is false. When submitted, the
provider is making a false statement to the federal government, which
triggers potential FCA liability.100
For many services, Medicare's sole reimbursement standard is the
statutory "reasonable and necessary" standard. But, for particular
services, Medicare provides specific coverage determinations beyond
the statutory language. Primarily for Medicare Part B, which includes
reimbursement for participating providers, the program establishes
codes for particular services for which it will reimburse. 101 For about
98 Kinney, supra note 50, at 1463.

In 2009, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit clearly held that, due to the
language and structure of the Medicare statute, CMS is prohibited from only covering
the "least costly alternative" in the Medicare program. See Hays v. Sebelius, 589 F.3d
1279, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In the case, a Medicare beneficiary had challenged a
Medicare determination that allowed for reimbursement for a particular prescription
"only up to the price of its least costly alternative." Id. The D.C. Circuit agreed with
the beneficiary, noting that, due to the wording of the Medicare statute, "reasonable
and necessary" did not modify "expenses," but rather, only modifies "items or
services." Id. at 1281; see also Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost, supra note 39, at 45
(suggesting that the statute be rewritten to allow for cost to be considered in coverage
policy).
The Hays holding, of course, prevents the Secretary of Health and Human Services
from reimbursing for a drug at a cheaper alternative's rate; instead, she can "make
only a binary choice: either an item or service is reasonable and necessary, in which
case it may be covered at the statutory rate, or it is unreasonable or unnecessary, in
which case it may not be covered at all." Hays, 589 F.3d at 1283. Further, on a more
important note, as has been previously argued, it cannot be the case that "reasonable"
within the statute can be read to "include what it is reasonable to pay for, at least
going so far as to allow CMS the right to consider cost effectiveness of new treatment"
due to the historical development of the program. Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost, supra
note 39, at 46.
99 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS-1500: HEALTH INSURANCE
CLAIM FORM (2005), available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/CMSForms/downloads/CMS1500805.pdf.
100 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012) (making illegal either "false or fraudulent claim[s]"
or "false record[s] or statement[s]").
101 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Medicare Coverage Determination Process in the
United States, in HEALTH CARE COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL
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one-quarter of newly-developed codes, Medicare establishes an NCD,
which provides some limitation on, or specification for, the
reimbursable service.10 NCDs are universally applicable, and are
subject to a formal rulemaking process.1 03 Beyond NCDs, regional and/
or local Medicare contractors can issue LCDs 104 for particular parts of
the country, based upon the medical standards of care, research
findings, expert opinion, and advice from other associations. 105 These
10 6
are applicable only in certain geographic areas.
When creating NCDs, Medicare has rejected previous attempts to
explicitly consider cost effectiveness,107 and as a result, Medicare now
does not consider the cost effectiveness of most reimbursable
benefits. 08 Medicare has clearly stated, "[clost effectiveness is not a
factor CMS considers in making NCDs. In other words, the cost of a
particular technology is not relevant in the determination of whether
the technology improves health outcomes or should be covered for the
Medicare population through an NCD."10 9

Medicare's NCD process was updated in the summer of 2013,110 but
still provides no consideration of cost effectiveness when evaluating
new services. Despite recent claims, "there is little evidence that
Medicare denies coverage of effective technologies solely on the basis
of cost.""' Further, researchers have found "no clear evidence of an
implicit threshold" of cost-effectiveness when evaluating NCD
applications.

112

In addition to the lack of cost consideration in determining NCDs,
other procedurally-based characteristics of the NCD application
process confer an advantage on those who want CMS to approve and
create an NCD for new, potentially expensive procedures and
COMPARATIVE STUDY 209,
102

211 (Timothy Soltzfus Jost ed., 2005).

Id. at 212.

103 See Blanchard, supra note 92, at 615 (describing the "formal process"); see also
DeBoer, supra note 38, at 512 (laying out "coverage decision-making processes").
104 DeBoer, supra note 38, at 506.
105 Jost, supra note 101, at 212-13.

106

See id.

See id. at 217-18.
108 See id. at 230.
107

109

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &

MEDICAID SERVS., FACTORS CMS CONSIDERS IN OPENING A

NATIONAL COVERAGE DETERMINATION

(2006), available at http:/www.cms.gov/medicare-

coverage-database/details/medicare-coverage-document-details.aspx?MCDld=6&McdName
=Factors+CMS+Considers+in+Opening+a+National+Coverage+Determination.
110 See Medicare Coverage DeterminationProcess, supra note 82.
111 Jost, supra note 101, at 219.
12 See Chambers et al., supranote 85, at E14.
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products. Specifically, there are "multiple entry points into" the
reimbursement methodology available to manufacturers, allowing
"proponents of a new technology to intervene more aggressively when
they see things going badly." 1 3 Further, proponents of coverage of
new technologies "have multiple levers to take action if they see the
process going astray." 114 Finally, few opponents of coverage
determinations exist, given the lack of interest by any one individual
or group to argue against the broadening of coverage
determinations.115 All these factors make the process "poorly suited for

making cost-benefit calculi" and allows for "many opportunities to
1 6
game the system." '
Other challenges hamper Medicare's coverage determinations. A
scholar has noted that coverage decisions are not designed to be
necessarily "accurate," and instead are "political decision[s]." 11 7
Consequently, reviewing courts must ask whether coverage
determinations were "reasonable" instead of "accurate.""18 For its part,
CMS argues that criteria have been adopted to evaluate NCD
applications, but others have pointed out that these criteria are not
formalized or published. 119 Finally, the concerns surrounding the
NCD process are compounded by the fact that Medicare - in many
instances - seems willing to initially pay for services that are not
covered by the program. In a number of recent overtreatment cases,
even though the particular provider's care did not comply with
Medicare's applicable NCD, the program still paid for the service
administered, only for the DOJ to investigate the administered service
years later.120
Particularly for services for which an NCD has not been established
- and the services that are allegedly not in compliance with
Medicare's medical necessity determination - Medicare seems
trapped by its requirement to pay out on claims quickly. 121 Required

117

Jost, supra note 101, at 229-30.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Kinney, supra note 50, at 1500.

118

Id.

113
114
115
116

119 See Michael S. Kolber, Opacity and Cost Effectiveness Analysis in Medicare
Coverage Decisions: Health Policy Encounters Administrative Law, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
515, 515 (2009).
120 See Buck, Caring Too Much, supranote 23, at 496-99.
121 See T.R. GOLDMAN, HEALTH AFFAIRS, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF: ELIMINATING FRAUD
AND ABUSE 2 (2012), available at http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_
pdfs/healthpolicybrief_72.pdf (noting that Medicare was "designed to enroll 'any
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to immediately pay providers for care administered, the program has
historically relied on the "pay and chase" method of fraud and abuse
enforcement.12 2 This creates the baffling potential situation where
Medicare has not provided a positive coverage determination or has
otherwise limited the types of services for which it will reimburse, but
still quickly pays for an uncovered service.
This complicates the participating providers' views of Medicare's
standard-setting function. Providers may think that Medicare either
does not have the will -

or the personnel -

to actually enforce its

NCD standards; it will pay anyway. From a legal perspective, this
clouds the analysis. Under traditional contract law, Medicare would
have a difficult time challenging the quality of the service rendered
after it pays for it. By paying for the service, Medicare seems to be
satisfied by the care administered. Further, by receiving
reimbursement for the service, providers mistakenly believe that the
service is reasonable and necessary. Indeed, if it weren't, Medicare
would not have paid for it. When this medical necessity determination
is already ambiguous - or impacted heavily by minor details Medicare's prompt payment may encourage providers to continue
administering the procedure in a certain way that the DOJ will
characterize as health care fraud later.
I.

TAKING ADVANTAGE OF NEW TRANSPARENCY

This proposal advocating a shift in the focus of overtreatment
regulation coincides with the beginning of a new era of increased
transparency surrounding what particular providers charge to - and
pocket in profit due to their participation in - the Medicare program.
As Medicare's data-driven era begins in earnest, a corresponding
recalibration of legal accountability seems timely and appropriate. In
some ways, newly-released figures beg for reasoned-but-swift legal
regulation.
For example, the top ten physicians who charged Medicare the most
received more than $121 million in Part B reimbursement from the
program in 2012.123 Notwithstanding the particular details of the
providers' bills, it would appear that the government would be
willing provider' and to reimburse claims quickly for the services provided .... The
emphasis on rapid payment, as opposed to identifying and rooting out false or inflated
claims, makes both programs susceptible to fraud").
122 Id. at 1.
123 SeeJason Millman, The Top 10 Medicare Billers Explain Why They Charged $121M in
One Year, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2014), httpi/www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkbog/
wp/2014/04/09/the-top-10-medicare-billers-explain-why-they-charged-121m-in-one-year/.
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interested in pursuing regulatory solutions. Indeed, just 2% of
physicians are responsible for 25% of all Medicare payments. 124
Unfortunately, these new data demonstrate the cost challenges
facing the program, but also highlight the fact that there is no
sufficient agency-based regime in place to address them. This is
particularly shown by the fact that much of the waste highlighted by
the data releases is a result of administered care that has been legally
delivered in compliance with Medicare's NCD determinations.
Consequently, the imminent challenge of improving overtreatment
regulation must concern itself with building a calibrated framework in
an attempt to deter and prevent some of the program's most wasteful
but currently legal abuses - without harming Medicare's quality.
This new era of transparency within Medicare has been
demonstrated by two occurrences: (1) a newly released report that
shows the main sources of waste within the Medicare program; 125 and
(2) a massive data release in the spring of 2014 that documented
providers' patterns of billing and utilization, illustrating each
physician's total billed amount to Medicare in 2012.126 A summary of
both - highlighting the scope of the challenge facing Medicare and
the need for a reasoned legal solution - is central to this analysis.
A.

Waste in PlainSight

The June 2014 Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
("MedPAC") 127 report, entitled "A Data Book: Health Care Spending
and the Medicare Program," noted the financial challenges facing the
124 See Brett Norman, Release of Medicare Pay Data Puts Hard Focus on Top-Billers,
POLITICO (Apr. 9, 2014, 5:01 AM EDT), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/

medicare-pay-data-laid-bare-105500.html.
125 See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, A DATA BOOK: HEALTH CARE SPENDING
AND THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 14 (2014) [hereinafter A DATA BOOK].
126 See Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/StatisticsTrends-and-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/ (last modified Apr. 9, 2014).
127 According to its website:
[MedPAC] is an independent congressional agency... to advise the U.S.
Congress on issues affecting the Medicare program. The Commission's
statutory mandate is quite broad: In addition to advising the Congress on
payments to private health plans participating in Medicare and providers in
Medicare's traditional fee-for-service program, MedPAC is also tasked with
analyzing access to care, quality of care, and other issues affecting Medicare.
About MedPAC, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY
medpac- (last visited Dec. 30, 2014).

COMM'N,

http://www.medpac.gov/-about-
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program.128 In addition to generally demonstrating the rising costs per
capita within Medicare, it also pointed out which particular
procedures were most subject to the highest volume and
expenditure.129

Generally, as has been widely reported, 130 health care costs have
"relentless[ly]" increased, 131 and are projected to continue to do so. 132
In 1966, health care spending was "about 6 percent" of GDP, and in
2009, it was 17%. 13 3 "Projections suggest that total health care
134
spending will make up about 19% of GDP by 2022."
Medicare alone made up 23% of overall personal health care
spending in 2012,135 making it the "largest single purchaser of health
care in the United States."' 36 Its share of GDP rose from less than 1%
in 1966 to 3.5% of GDP in 2012137 - and the program is projected to
exceed 5% in 2030 and 6% of GDP in 2080.138 The escalating expense
is largely due to a quickly increasing population of beneficiaries;
"[t]he rapid growth in the number of beneficiaries began in 2011 and
will continue through 2030 as members of the baby-boom generation
128 A DATA BOOK, supra note 125, at 14.
129 See id. at 101
(noting that diagnostic cardiac catheterization, cataract
procedures with IOL insert, and Level I plain film except teeth are the most expensive
and highest-volume procedures).
130 See, e.g., Paul Davidson, Health Care Spending Growth Hits 10-Year High, USA
TODAY (Apr. 1, 2014, 6:51 PM EDT), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/
2014/03/30/health-care-spending/7007987/ (noting that "[hlealth care spending rose
at the fastest pace in 10 years [in the fourth quarter of 20131").
131 Noam N. Levey, U.S. HealthcareCosts Keep Rising But at Slower Pace, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 6,
2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-0107-healthcare-spending20140107-story.html (noting "moderate" rising costs in most recent quarters, but
noting that, in twelve of the past fifteen years, health spending grew more quickly
than the larger economy); see also Reid Wilson, Health Care Spending Still Rising for
States and Cities, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/0 1/3 1/health-care-spending-still-rising-for-states-and-ci ties/
(noting that "health-care spending is consuming a greater percentage of state and local
government budgets than at any time since the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services began collecting data").
132 See A DATA BOOK, supra note 125, at 7.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135

Id. at 5.

136

Id.

137

Id. at 7.

Id. at 8. The Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees forecast that
Medicare spending could approach 7% of GDP by 2088. See A Summary of the 2014
Annual Reports, Soc. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/ (last visited Aug. 13,
2014).
138
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reach age 65 and become eligible to receive benefits," according to
MedPAC. 139 Indeed, using Part A enrollment figures, MedPAC has
noted that "[t]he total number of people enrolled in the Medicare
program will increase from about 50 million in 2012 to about 81
million in 2030."140 Aside from the rising future enrollment in the
program, utilization rates and the cost associated with those services
continue to rise; "Medicare spending among [fee-for-service]
beneficiaries has increased significantly since 2003," according to the
report.141

The two most expensive sectors of the Medicare program are,
predictably, hospital inpatient and physician payments. 142 Inpatient
spending among fee-for-service beneficiaries per capita jumped from
$3,144 in 2003 to $3,632 in 2012 (although that was down from a
high of $3,764 in 2009), whereas the same metric for physician
reimbursement rose from $1,461 in 2003 to $2,134 in 2012.143 Just
25% of the most expensive fee-for-service beneficiaries are responsible
for 82% of the total program spending. 144 In total, hospital inpatient
payment increased from $111 billion in 2003 to $135 billion in
2011.145 Physician reimbursement climbed from $49 billion in 2003 to
$70 billion in 2012.146

Specific to physician reimbursement, Medicare spending increases
have been caused by growth in the amount of procedures
administered. 147 Per beneficiary, Medicare's expenditures for physician
services raised 72% from 2000 to 2012.148 Further, the volume of tests
administered raised 90% from 2000 to 2012, and imaging volume
increased 73% during those same years per beneficiary. 149 This led
MedPAC to conclude that these "volume increases translate directly to
growth in Part B spending and premiums. They are also largely
responsible for the negative updates required by the sustainable
139 A DATA BOOK, supra note 125, at 8; see also Richard Wolf, Medicare to Swell with
Baby Boomer Onslaught, USA TODAY (Dec. 30, 2010), http://usatoday30.usatoday.
com/news/washington/2010-12-30-medicare30 ST N.htm (noting that Baby Boomer
aging will increase Medicare spending).
140 A DATA BOOK, supra note 125, at 22.
141 Id.at 3.

147

See id.at 4.
See id.
See id. at 12.
Id.
at 3.
Id.
See id.at 90.

148

Id.

149

Id.at 96.

142
143
144
145
146
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growth rate formula. Rapid volume growth may be a sign that some
services in the physician fee schedule are mispriced." 150
Other numbers in the report confirmed the phenomenon that when
Medicare pays for it, utilization increases.15 1 Of particular note, both
CT and magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") scans ballooned between
2000 and 2012 - with CT scans on parts of the body other than the
head increasing 114%, and MRIs on parts of the body other than the
brain raising 122%.152 Both CTs and MRI scans were reflected in the
top twenty most expensive hospital outpatient services for Medicare
- with these twenty services making up 44% of total payments made
in the ambulatory payment classification ("APC"). 153
B. High Utilizers
For the first time since 1979,154 and after the American Medical
Association ("AMA") "chose not to try to block the release of the
information"' 155 after doing so for thirty-five years, 156 Medicare released
annual provider biller and utilization data for 2012 to the public in a
massive disclosure in the spring of 2014. Months later, CMS released
data listing what different hospitals nationwide charge for "some of
the most common inpatient procedures."'57 These data represented a
total of more than $77 billion in payments within Part B fee-for-service
reimbursement to more than 880,000 health care providers. 158 Total
150

Id.

Cf. id. at 104 (presenting that observation hours more than doubled between
2006 and 2012, following changes that made the hours easier to count in 2006 and
changes that paid separately for observation hours starting in 2002).
152 See id. at 107.
153 Id. at 101.
154 See Chad Terhune et al., Release of Medicare Doctor Payments Shows Some Huge
Payouts, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/businessAa-fimedicare-doctor-pay-20140409-story.html.
155 Reed Abelson & Sarah Cohen, Sliver of Medicare Doctors Get Big Share of
Payouts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/business/
sliver-of-medicare-doctors-get-big-share-of-payouts.html.
156 See Joe Carlson, CMS Reveals Medicare Physician Pay Data, MODERN HEAL-CARE
(Apr. 9, 2014), httpJ/www.modemhealthcare.com/article/20140409/NEWS/304099954
[hereinafter CMS Reveals].
157 See Julie Creswell et al., Hospital Charges Surge for Common Ailments, Data
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.comI2014/06/03/business/
Medicare-Hospital-Billing-Data-Is-Released.html. Although these data may have
limited utility and relevance to what Medicare ultimately pays for a procedure (after a
series of negotiations regarding payments), it still highlights the growing recognition
of spiraling and inconsistent cost structures. See id.
158 See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Historic Release of
151

1288

[Vol. 48:1261

University of California,Davis

payments to doctors totaled almost $64 billion, with more than $12
billion going toward paying for office and outpatient visits. 159

The media immediately noted those providers with the highest
reimbursement totals through the program, calling Medicare "the
source of a small fortune for many U.S. doctors."''

60

Collectively, the

fortune was not small; doctors with the highest reimbursement
amounts were responsible for about $15 billion of the total payments
made by Medicare - "roughly a quarter of the total [Medicare
payments] .161 The data allowed the public to search for its health care
providers, and also led many to believe that "[r]egulators and others
are . . likely to seize on some of this information to find those doctors
62
who perform an unusually high volume of services.'
Unsurprisingly, according to the Washington Post, of the top ten
Medicare earners, three "already had drawn scrutiny from the federal
63

government."'1

Criticism of the data release was swift. AMA President Ardis Dee
Hoven noted that "the broad data dump... [has] significant shortcomings regarding the accuracy and value of the medical services
rendered

by

physicians.'

6

4

The

AMA

is

concerned

about

"inaccuracies, misinterpretations, false conclusions, and other
unintended consequences," he noted. 165 And his concerns are not
insubstantial; for example, some doctors in a large physician practice
may bill under one single physician code, greatly distorting the
amount for which each provider is responsible. 66 Sums also
commonly go to other employees' salaries, taxes, overhead costs, and

Data Gives Consumers Unprecedented Transparency on the Medical Services
Physicians Provide and How Much They Are Paid (Apr. 9, 2014), available at
http://www.cms.gov/NewsroomMediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/2014-Pressreleases-items/2014-04-09.html; see also Terhune et al., supra note 154.
159 See Abelson & Cohen, supra note 155; Dan Keating et al., Database:How Much
Medicare Pays Doctors, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/special/national/medicare-doctors-database/.
160 See Peter Whoriskey et al., Data Uncover Nation's Top Medicare Billers, WASH. POST
(Apr. 9, 2014), httpi/www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/data-uncover-nationstop-medicare-billers/2014/04/08/9101a77e-bf39-1 1e3-b574-f8748871856a_story.html.
161 See Abelson & Cohen, supra note 155.
162

Id.

Whoriskey et al., supra note 160.
164 Carlson, CMS Reveals, supra note 156.
165 Id.
166 See id.; Millman, supra note 123 (noting that many physicians who are in the
top ten are there because their names are used for billing purposes to represent the
work of multiple physicians).
163
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patient drugs. 167 However, presumably, more sophisticated data will
allow regulators to exclude from investigation those providers whose
additional data demonstrate one of these uncommon arrangements.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the data release allows government
regulators, and surely the public, to apply pressure to those who are
most responsible for a substantial segment of Medicare's rising
expenses. If nothing else, it exposes those who are most responsible
for high utilization rates. The release also highlights the current
vacuum of legal tools available to the overseeing agencies to limit
costs; again, Medicare seems powerless.
1II.

IN SEARCH OF A STANDARD

Fraught with process-based complications, Medicare struggles to
slow cost growth through its statutorily-constrained channels. For its
part, the DOJ -

through its regulation of overtreatment -

has relied

on Medicare's NCDs to decide which providers to target for
investigations. But leaning on NCDs to determine the targets of an
overtreatment investigation may both: (1) increase the regime's
susceptibility to disorder and overuse because of the inaccuracy of the
program's coverage determinations; and (2) prevent the DOJ from
casting a wider, but more accurate, net to discourage providers from
administering expensive procedures and ordering costly products. As
currently constituted, the legal framework seems to suggest that a
doctor's repeated administration of a substantially above-average
number of procedures does not, by itself, make that care medically
unnecessary.
In order to propose a new construct of overtreatment regulation, it
is worthwhile to examine current and recent overtreatment
investigations to understand the tension that results from use of the
medical necessity standard; two such investigations are summarized
below. In one, the nationwide implantable cardioverter defibrillator
("ICD") investigation features a scenario in which the DOJ has used
Medicare's applicable NCD standard as the initial governing standard
in an effort to separate physicians engaged in health care fraud from
physicians providing legitimate treatment. 168 In the second example,
no applicable NCD governs, but allegations are made that the care at
issue was not medically necessary. Both follow below.

167 See Millman, supra note 123.
168 See Buck, Caring Too Much, supra note 23, at 492-93; Buck, Enforcement
Overdose, supra note 25, at 277.
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Reimbursement Standardsas Law

Now into its fourth year, the DOJ's nationwide investigation of ICDs
has resulted in one settlement thus far with now-defunct Medcath
Corporation for $6 million. 169 "Hundreds of unresolved cases" are
pending.' 70 Although at this point, the DOJ is formerly investigating
only hospitals, officials "may eventually look past the hospitals where
implantations took place and target the doctors recommending the
devices to patients"' 71 for potential liability, according to those
involved with the investigations.
Specifically, the investigation is targeting providers who placed an
ICD - a highly-expensive device, 172 for which Medicare pays outside of Medicare's NCD standard. 73 Most basically, these providers
placed an ICD in the chest of a patient within Medicare's mandatory
waiting period. t74 After the investigation, a number of clinics and
hospitals have defended their providers' determinations that ICDs
were medically necessary and appropriate - even those not in
compliance with Medicare's NCD timing requirements. 1 75 As the
nationwide investigation has continued, it has provided an example of
what happens when an NCD splits from a clinical standard "on the
ground" and that split results in a nationwide health care fraud
investigation.
In this case, Medicare's NCD required a waiting period of a
minimum number of days between an adverse cardiac event and the
ICD placement, but the investigation has revealed that a number of
providers did not comply with that standard. 176 In particular,
Medicare's applicable NCD standard governing ICD placement - and
169 See Joe Carlson,

Investigation into Overuse of Heart Devices Credited with

Lowering Number of Procedures, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140128/NEWS/301289915. Interestingly,
however, the DOJ has made no publicly-available statement regarding the existence of
this settlement.
170

Id.

171

Id.

172 See A DATA BOOK, supra note 125, at 101 (listing "cardioverter-defibrillator

implantation" - and the "insertion/replacement/repair of cardioverter-defibrillator
leads" as the most expensive procedures as part of the "ambulatory payment
classification" within Medicare).
173 For more information on the investigation, see Buck, Enforcement Overdose,
supra note 25, at 277-83. For more information about how Medicare came to the
coverage decision for ICDs, see Fox, The Hidden Role of Cost, supra note 39, at 25-30.
174 See Buck, Enforcement Overdose, supra note 25, at 277-79.
175 Id.
176 Id.

20151

Breaking the Fever

1291

was last revised in 2005.177
requiring the waiting period Conversely, the American College of Cardiology ("ACC"), American
Heart Association ("AHA"), and the Heart Rhythm Society ("HRS")
have established guidelines numerous times, first promulgating
"general" guidelines for practitioners in 1984 and since updating them
in 1991, 1998, 2002, 2008, 2012,178 and again in 2013.179
Further, breaking from Medicare's NCD, the ACC and HRS "have
developed appropriate use criteria ("AUC") to adjudicate the
appropriateness of ICD implantation" to further aid clinicians in
relatively common scenarios. 180 The AUC process is purportedly
"rigorous" and "incorporates evidence based medicine."' 8 1 Adversely,
the 2005 Medicare NCD "does not address many of the scenarios for
primary-prevention ICD use that were considered appropriate by the
AUC authors."182 As such, providers and hospitals that placed ICDs at
certain timing intervals were likely in compliance with the AUC - the
standard promulgated by three professional organizations - but not
with Medicare's NCD, and, as a result of billing Medicare for the
placements, have faced fraud investigations. The investigation has
highlighted the battle between providers and regulators over who
should control clinical standards, with the profession arguing for the
autonomy of the physicians and the defensibility of the hospitals, and
the government first taking a particularly aggressive approach, and
then exempting certain providers and clinics who committed
83
"technical violations" from liability.'
This, of course, is a signal from the DOJ that the Medicare NCD may
not represent the most accurate line between legitimate care and fraud.
If a provider can violate Medicare's NCD but be exempted from fraud
prosecution, the DOJ appears to be recognizing that there is room
between the standards. Indeed, if there is room between the standards
- meaning that some providers did not comply with an NCD but who
are no longer targets of a health care fraud investigation - then it

178

See Fogel et al., supra note 90, at 13.
See id.

179

See Andrea M. Russo et al., ACCF/HRS/AHAIASE/IHFSAISCAI/SCCTISCMR 2013

177

Appropriate Use Criteria for Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators and Cardiac
Resynchronization Therapy, 10 HEART RHYTHM ell (2013).
180 See Fogel et al., supra note 90, at 13.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 See Buck, Enforcement Overdose, supra note 25, at 280-81 (presenting the DOJ's
proposed settlement framework with providers who committed only a "technical
violation").

1292

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 48:1261

indicates that the NCD does not represent the most current and
accurate clinical standard. Still, the picture is not completely clear;
some of the providers arguing for autonomy in these investigations
have financial relationships with some ICD manufacturers84 - a fact
that undoubtedly complicates the analysis.
Nevertheless, the ICD investigation highlights the potential
difficulty in basing an overtreatment investigation on a Medicare
NCD. Affected by delays and shifting standards for liability, it is
currently unclear which providers - and as a result, hospitals and
clinics - committed health care fraud by virtue of placing ICDs in
violation of Medicare's NCDs. After four years of investigation,
providers are still waiting for resolution of these allegations.
B.

Medical Necessity Regulation

On its website, EMH Elyria Medical Center ("EMH") in suburban
Cleveland boasts that it "has received numerous awards for quality of
care, operational efficiency, financial performance, and adaptation to
the environment."' 185 But in 2006, EMH was under a cloud of

suspicion; it was allegedly responsible for the fact that Medicare
patients in Elyria were administered angioplasties four times more
than the national average, and three times more than the state
average. 18 6 EMH's cardiology clinic, the North Ohio Heart Center
("NOHC"), was largely responsible for the high rate. 187
Unsurprisingly, cardiologists at NOHC had a self-admitted
"unabashed enthusiasm for angioplasties"' SS - indeed, according to
them, the higher rate was "simply a function of ... doctors' detecting
disease more often in their patients than physicians elsewhere might
184 Seven of nine authors on a recent viewpoint article that present this conflict
have received honoraria, grants, fellowship support, or research support, have been
consultants for, and/or have equity in, Biotronic, Boston Scientific, Medtronic, and/or
St. Jude Medical - all four entities manufacture and market ICDs. See Fogel et al.,
supra note 90, at 12. Additionally, five of those same authors - with perhaps the
same relationships with the ICD manufacturers at the time of the writing - authored
the 2013 AUC guidelines. Compare id. at 1 (listing Andrew E. Epstein, Bruce D.
Lindsay, Mark S. Kremers, Suraj Kapa, and Andrea M. Russo as co-authors), with
Russo et al., supra note 179 (same).
185 See Awards, UNIv. HOSPS. ELYRIA MED. CTR., http://www.uhhospitals.org/elyria/
about/awards (last visited Aug. 23, 2013).
186 See Reed Abelson, Health ProcedureIs Off the Charts in an Ohio City, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug.
18,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/business/18stent.html
[hereinafter Health Procedure].
187 See id.
188 Id.
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spot, and being quicker to intervene."' 189 Dr. John Schaeffer, the
founder and president of NOHC, said NOHC "manage[d] very
aggressively the patients we careld] for" and "[we ha[d] excellent
outcomes."1 90
Perhaps predictably, this "aggressiveness" drew a qui tam'9 ' relator's
lawsuit under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 192 with the relator
alleging that by administering excessive angioplasties and placing
medically unnecessary stents, the doctors at NOHC had violated the
law.' 93 This was followed by a years-long DOJ investigation that
ultimately resulted in a $4.4 million settlement1 94 The DOJ's
accompanying announcement noted that the settlement agreement
"resolve[d] allegations that between 2001 and 2006 EMH and NOHC
195
performed unnecessary cardiac procedures on Medicare patients."'
For their part, cardiologists at NOHC defended their "high-quality
care." 96 According to their statements, the doctors at NOHC believed
in the efficacy of the drug-coated stents they placed, using them even
when other physicians may have recommended a more-expensive
bypass surgery. What complicated the analysis in 2006 was the dearth
of studies that conclusively showed which approach - stents, drugs,
or bypass surgery - was most effective in the long term.' 97 In addition
to providing more procedures, physicians at NOHC were more likely
to "perform diagnostic coronary angiographies on patients - the
189

Id.

190 Id.
191 To read the statute providing for qui tam claims, see 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)

(2012).
192 Id. §§ 3729-3733 (2012).
193 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, EMH Regional Medical Center and

North Ohio Heart Center to Pay $4.4 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations
(Jan. 4, 2013)

[hereinafter

EMH

Regional

Press

Releasel,

available

at

http:/Iwww.justice.gov/usao/ohn/news/2013/04janemh.html.
194 Id.
195

Id.

196 See Abelson, Health Procedure,supra note 186.
197 It was not until 2011 that a seminal study was released in the Journal of the
American Medical Association that cast serious doubt on the effectiveness and

appropriateness of stents. See Paul S. Chan et al., Appropriateness of Percutaneous
Coronary Intervention, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1, 53 (2011) (concluding that only 50%
of stents were clearly appropriate for non-acute indications). Bloomberg reported that
the American College of Cardiology has since removed the term "inappropriate" from
stents' clinical guidelines, and has replaced it with "rarely appropriate." Peter
Waldman, Doctors Use Euphemism for $2.4 Billion in Needless Stents, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
30, 2013, 9:01 PM PDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-30/doctors-useeuphemism-for-2-4-billion-in-needless-stents.html. About 700,000 coronary stents are
placed in the United States annually. Id.
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primary test that [was] used to detect blockages in the first place."' 198
Further, doctors at NOHC engaged in "staging" - in which the
cardiologists would not unblock all affected vessels during one
procedure, claiming that "operating on too many vessels during a
single procedure" presented "a safety issue." 199 Others have referred to
the technique as "recycling patients" - in which NOHC performed
"repeated procedures, including stents, on the same patients." 200
In combatting any indication of misconduct, NOHC president Dr.
Shaeffer noted that his doctors "follow[ed] medical guidelines in
determining treatments." 20 1 He also stated that "patients with coronary
artery disease [were] best served when doctors intervene[d] quickly"
- "[wiith absolutely no exception... patients given aggressive
treatment will come out with a better outcome," he said. 202 In the
summer of 2006, when the New York Times published its original
story, the DOJ had not begun an investigation, but that quickly
changed after Kenny Loughner, a "former manager of EMH's
catheterization and electrophysiology laboratory" filed a qui tam
complaint in October of that year. 203 Even though the qui tam relator
Kenny Loughner alleged that "doctors urged nurses and others to
falsify complaints of chest pain to justify the unnecessary
angioplasties" and "described the doctors' technique of treating
patients in stages, forcing patients to come back for multiple
procedures," the hospital noted that the DOJ did not include the
allegations in its findings "and they [were] without merit," according
2
to NOHC. 04

The federal government "alleged that EMH and NOHC performed
angioplasty and stent placement procedures on patients who had heart
disease but whose blood vessels were not sufficiently occluded to
require the particular procedures at issue." 20 5 For his part, Steven M.
Dettelbach, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio,
admonished that "[p]atient health and taxpayer dollars have to come
198

See Abelson, Health Procedure,supra note 186.

199 See

id.

Sydney P. Freedberg, Mother Dies Amid Abuses in $110 Billion U.S. Stent Assembly
Line, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 10, 2013, 9:01 PM PDT), http//www.bloomberg.com/news/201310-10/mother-dies-amid-abuses-in-110-billion-u-s-stent-assembly-line.html.
201 See Abelson, Health Procedure, supra note 186.
200

202

Id.

See EMH Regional Press Release, supra note 193.
Reed Abelson, U.S. Settles Accusations That Doctors Overtreated, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/business/us-settles-accusations-thatdoctors-overtreated.html [hereinafter U.S. Settles Accusations].
205 EMH Regional Press Release, supra note 193.
203

204
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before greed." 20 6 According to the evidence gathered in the case,
NOHC pressured its cardiologists to "refer patients to... [the] cath
lab," with one cardiologist noting that he saw "patients with an
astonishing number of stents that [he] hadn't heard before, sometimes
20 7
exceeding 20 stents."
The hospital made public statements following the settlement, with
chief executive Dr. Donald Sheldon saying that "no patients, to our
knowledge, were ever at risk, and there is no question that the patients
treated had heart disease and some degree of blockage." 208 Still, he
noted "that the settlement represented 'a small percentage' of its
cardiology patients who were judged by Medicare to have not had
severe-enough medical conditions to justify the procedures performed
by North Ohio Heart Center doctors." 20 9 Interestingly, Sheldon noted
that "EMH Healthcare remains committed to providing the most
efficient care to patients." 210
Dr. Shaeffer posted an official statement in reaction to the settlement
to his blog. Noting that the settlement was "not an admission of
wrongdoing," but that NOHC settled "so we can put it behind us and
move forward," Shaeffer made clear that:
It is very important to note that this settlement is only about
whether or not Medicare covered some procedures we did six
to ten years ago that were considered cutting edge at the time.
As the physicians on the ground when these decisions were
made and the procedures were performed, we felt confident
we were making the correct choices for our patients. We still
do.... As leaders in cardiac care, we have always been early
adopters of new technology when we believe using it will help
improve our patients' lives. That was certainly the case when
drug-eluting stents were first introduced. We were using the
best technology available to take care of a high risk
population. We still are. Cardiac care has progressed
significantly in just the past few years, as all areas of medicine
have. All cardiologists, including our physicians at North Ohio
Heart Center, are implanting fewer stents than in the past

See id.
Freedberg, supra note 200.
208 Abelson, U.S. Settles Accusations, supra note 204.
209 Joe Carlson, Ohio Hospital, Cardiac Group to Pay $4.4 Million False Claims
Settlement, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.com
article/20130104/NEWS/301049951.
210 Id.
206
207
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because delivering optimal medical therapy with lifestyle
changes reduces the need for these procedures. 211
Indeed, in response to the allegations, providers at NOHC could
argue that the FCA does not explicitly make "aggressive" management
of cardiac care illegal,212 sure to bring up that it was not clinically
evident in 2006, let alone 2001, that aggressive angioplasties and
stents were not generally helpful to the patients that received them
(and, instead, often times, harmful). 213 After all, at the time these were
214
performed, providers say they were "cutting edge" procedures.
Still, in an enforcement regime tasked with preventing fraud and
abuse in an effort to limit cost growth within Medicare, the markers of
the NOHC investigation seem strongly indicative of, at least, health
care waste. As the providers at NOHC were administering a procedure
at three times the state average and four times the national average,
they had a limited ability to argue that all of these procedures were
clinically necessary. Unlike the clinical murkiness in the ICD
investigation example, the fact that cardiologists exceeded the state
and nationwide averages by a large amount was undeniable. To
assume that all the NOHC procedures were medically necessary, one
would have to conclude that the average physician nationwide failed
to place a number of medically necessary stents. Different from the
ICD conclusion, cardiologists at NOHC could not argue that the
standard applied to them failed to reflect clinical realities; it was
composed of comparisons with their peers nationwide and statewide.

211

North Ohio Heart Reaches Settlement; Continues to Provide High-Quality Cardiac

Care, N. OHIO HEART, OHIO MED. GRP., PARTNERS FOR YOUR HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 4, 2013),

http://blog.partnersforyourhealth.com/Blog/bid/93734/North-Ohio-Heart-ReachesSettlement-Continues-to-Provide-High-Quality-Cardiac-Care [hereinafter NOHC Blog
Post].
212 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012) (making illegal "knowingly," "present[ingl," or
"us[ingl" a "false or fraudulent claim," "false record," or "statement material to a false
or fraudulent claim," among other things). The key argument here would focus on the
intent standard under the FCA. If providers could argue that they lacked fraudulent
intent, this would be a potential defense to an FCA charge.
213 See Kelly Brewington, Whether a Stent Is Needed Can Be Tough Call, BALT. SUN (Jan.
25, 2010), httpi/articles.baltimoresun.conV2010-01-25/health/bal-md.stents25jan25_stents-heart-patients-cardiologists (noting that "for heart patients with few symptoms and
less than severe artery blockage, whether to sue a stent is a question with no clear-cut
answer, say cardiologists.... A recent internal review of heart patients at St. Joseph
medical Center in Towson found 369 patients received the coronary implants
unnecessarily. Those findings have... highlight[edl a debate among cardiologists and
confusion among patients over when stents are necessary").
214 See NOHC Blog Post, supra note 211.
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Thus, the central insight from the regulatory story of NOHC must
focus on the fact that it was the departurefrom average over the course
of the year (by four magnitudes nationally), rather than a violation of
medical necessity, that made their allegations compelling. At the time,
the DOJ could not argue that the stents were not medically necessary,
and, indeed, the cardiologists at NOHC could argue that they felt the
stents were medically necessary. Given the prevailing medical
knowledge in 2003, the NOHC cardiologists' belief may not have been
unreasonable - based upon the science itself, it at least was likely not
demonstrably fraudulent.
But it was the cumulative excess compared to cardiologists
nationwide - that made their stent placements unreasonable. Indeed,
it was the excess of the providers of the NOHC that was egregious the excess added to the power of the allegations, making the case
much easier that the cardiologists at NOHC were at least wasteful and presumably, fraudulent. Viewing the allegations in light of the
cumulative excess helps to explain why the NOHC investigation and
penalty may feel more justified than the ICD investigation.
IV.

A NEW

CONSTRUCT OF OVERTREATMENT REGULATION

As currently constituted, linking the overtreatment investigation to
the "reasonable and necessary" language of the Medicare statute, or
more formally the program's NCD or LCD determinations, locks the
DOJ into conceiving of these overtreatment cases as always featuring
medically unnecessary care. And, as a result, the regulation of
overtreatment, and the resolution of fraud allegations, is subject to a
clinically-based answer; whether the procedure is truly medically
necessary or not will determine the outcome of the case. Like the ICD
investigation shows, in some instances, the CMS and the DOJ may not
be able to get and stay ahead of providers' clinical innovation and
development. Especially for rapidly developing procedures and
technologies, the coverage process seems ill-equipped to both govern
providers' behavior and provide reasonable rules for reimbursement.
Using a different metric avoids the risk of enforcing an outdated or
inaccurate clinical standard.
Further, the NOHC investigation aside, 215 a substantial amount of
the cost and utilization challenge posed in the overtreatment era
215 Metrics from the NOHC case particularly, the comparison between the
NOHC cardiologists and the national average - suggested that the cardiologists were
administering procedures that were not medically necessary. See Abelson, Health
Procedure, supra note 186 (noting that stents were being placed in Elyria at four times
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revolves around care that - when broken down into individuallyadministered procedures - cannot easily or clearly be called
unreasonable or unnecessary. It is care that, when repeated over the
course of a year, for instance, becomes cumulatively excessive, but is
often in the "grey" of clinical practice. It is the extra x-ray, the
inpatient, instead of outpatient, operation, and the extra stent performed repeatedly. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to assert that,
based upon clinical judgment, a particular patient may need a
relatively "aggressive" stent placement, but when every patient gets
the same "aggressive treatment," questions justifiably arise.
Through the accumulation of health care services, a pattern of
excessive waste or abuse may result. Without such clear evidence of
excess - evident, for instance, in the NOHC investigation above the overtreatment investigation gets bogged down in arguments
surrounding what was clinically more appropriate. A new construct
for overtreatment would jettison these clinical details for a more
straightforward approach.
A.

Three Important Characteristics

A new overtreatment construct provides guidance for the DOJ
focused on three chief characteristics: (1) cumulative utilization and
cost; (2) comparison with similarly-situated peers (importing the
standard from the profession); and (3) pre-investigatory notice. These
three chief characteristics of the new overtreatment regulatory scheme
are explored more deeply below.
1. Cumulative Utilization
From the academy, to Congress, to reimbursement policy,
"bundling" has become a buzzword, often mentioned when solutions
to Medicare's cost challenges are discussed. Nicholas Bagley has noted
that "Medicare must pay for care in much bigger bundles," and, in fact,
pay organizations a "lump-sum" that would then be distributed to
providers "to distribute the Medicare payments." 21 6 In 2013, as
established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
("ACA"),217 CMS announced the "Bundled Payments for Care
Improvement Initiative," in which "organizations will enter into
the national average).
216 Bagley, supra note 42, at 559 (emphasis added).
217 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 3023, 124 Stat. 119, 399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2012)).
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and performance

accountability for episodes of care." 218 Indeed, in some ways, the

inpatient prospective payment system ("PPS") for Medicare Part A
reimbursement that relies upon diagnosis-related groups ("DRGs") to
reimburse hospitals for acute care uses bundling to prospectively set
rates. 219 Hospitals are not rewarded for using more - in either
number or expense - of any service or product, largely because they
will not get paid for it.
Thus, within this new construct of overtreatment regulation, of
most importance is that the DOJ's attorneys use "bundled" data to
determine their targets of overtreatment investigations. Using
utilization data, outlier providers - after being compared to other
similarly-situated providers (both in subspecialty and geographic area)
- would be the initial targets of new overtreatment investigations.
These investigations would take into consideration the number of
patients treated, the number of services rendered, and potentially, the
costs of those services. Given the characteristics of the data released in
the spring of 2014, this information should be quite illuminating.2 20
For the DOJ, delinking the fraud standard from the medical
necessity standard - and instead, relying on cumulative utilization of
health services - would allow its prosecutors to free themselves from
the difficulty of arguing over particular medical services and
procedures. In a recent ICD investigation, for example, to deal with
the difficulty inherent in regulating providers engaged in clinically
complex procedures, the DOJ reached out to a provider association for
consultation in constructing proposed settlement arrangements. 221 The
law -

through its enforcers -

is simply not equipped with the

expertise to determine which providers are engaged in what can be

218

Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) Initiative: General Information,

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/bundled-

payments/ (last visited July 18, 2014) (emphasis added); see Fact Sheets: Bundled
Payments for Care Improvement Initiative Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. (Jan, 30, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Factsheets/2014-Fact-sheets-items/2014-01-30-2.html.
219 See Acute
Inpatient PPS, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,

http://www.cms.gov/Medicare(Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcutelnpatientPPS/
index.html (last modified Aug. 4, 2014).
220 In terms of liability, it would appear that the FCA may not be the most efficient
and accurate tool, and perhaps, a new overtreatment statute should be established but specific statutory solutions are beyond the scope of this analysis.
221 See Buck, Enforcement Overdose, supra note 25, at 279-80 (noting the reliance
on the Heart Rhythm Society by the DOJ to come up with fair settlement structure to
ICD investigation).
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called legitimate overtreatment, and those which are clearly
illegitimate. A simpler focus on provider-by-provider utilization allows
the DOJ to review the amount of services administered, claims filed,
and money spent by the federal government - and not a particular
patient's blood pressure or artery occlusion percentages. When the
harm is overutilization, a provider's cumulative utilization rates, over
the course of a year, billed to the Medicare program, can serve as an
accurate and defensible proxy for potential investigations and
settlements.
It also allows the DOJ to use overtreatment regulation to explicitly
and robustly target excess utilization within Medicare. Instead of using
it as a regulatory tool meant to enforce Medicare's reimbursement
standard, overtreatment regulation would globally seek to prevent
providers from administering excessive care to Medicare beneficiaries.
A straightforward "bundled" metric of annual utilization per patient
could be the first important step toward building a new framework.
2.

Comparison with Similarly-Situated Peers

Secondly, for overtreatment regulation to adequately protect
provider autonomy, maintain quality of care, and assure that it is
pursuing only illegitimate overtreatment, the controlling and
applicable standard - for determining the targets of overtreatment
investigations - must migrate away from the medical necessity or
NCD standard housed within Medicare to the clinical standard of care
set by the profession itself. This migration would force the DOJ to
determine its targets of overtreatment investigations by how that
provider compares to other similarly-situated peers, not how that
provider compares to Medicare's medical necessity standard or NCD.
The development would be positive for both participating providers
and Medicare beneficiaries.
As for participating providers, this shift would plant control of the
investigatory standard within the profession. Besides giving physicians
autonomy in this regulatory framework just because they value
autonomy, 222 this allows the foregoing standard of care to govern
providers just like it does in the medical malpractice context. Indeed,
if it is the case that the profession believes that stents should be placed
in a certain percentage of patients - borne out by the numbers of
222 Indeed, studies have shown providers' willingness to deceive third parties,
largely "reinforced by physicians' longstanding and deep-seated commitment toward
autonomy in all aspects of professional practice and hostility toward oversight by
nonmedical personnel." Hyman, supra note 50, at 542.
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individuals who receive stents in a given year - then a provider who
places stents in a number of patients exceeding that standard by a
substantial margin could be deemed a "high utilizer" with
comparatively-little controversy. There would be no need to
investigate whether providers adhered to a Medicare reimbursement
standard because the standard borrowed from within the profession is
likely to be highly reflective of clinical realities. And because conflicts
between CMS and providers can lead to potentially costly fraud
investigations and can affect clinical care, 223 it is vital that the
governing standards accurately reflect clinical reality. The clearest way
to ensure the governing standards reflect clinical reality is to link the
investigatory standard to the standard of care of practicing providers.
This shift also protects the innovation of providers in individual
cases. Allowing the provider community to set the applicable standard
allows for the recognition of a various range of acceptable clinical
behavior. Given heterogeneity in medical practice, it is surely the case
that some providers will diverge from others. Moving the governing
standard from a strict NCD to an acceptable range will allow the
regulatory regime to avoid targeting potential "false positives" providers who, because they do not comply with the letter of the
NCD, look like they are engaged in fraudulent overtreatment, but who
really may be the clinically-important innovators. Indeed, this shift
would force the enforcement regime to move away from targeting
providers who place ICDs at day thirty-eight instead of day forty, and
instead, focus its attention on the providers who place ICDs at a rate
that grossly exceeds other similarly-situated providers per patient.
This proposal is nothing new. Others have suggested - as a
potential solution to Medicare's cost crisis - allowing the profession
to set a standard of care and for Medicare to link reimbursement with
that determination.224 Although the instant proposal takes no stand on
changing Medicare reimbursement policy, others have argued that
Medicare should link its repayment structure and the DO] its
investigative enforcement regime to the profession's determination of
what is reasonable or necessary 225 as an effort to address Medicare's
cost challenges. 226 As has been argued, for example, "what counts as a
223

See Johnson, Regulating PhysicianBehavior, supra note 91, at 1029.

224

See Muriel R. Gillick, How Medicare Shapes the Way We Die, 8 J.

BIOMEDICAL L.

HEALTH

&

27, 37 (2012).

225 See Tito Fojo & Christine Grady, How Much Is Life Worth: Cetuximab, NonSmall Cell Lung Cancer, and the $440 Billion Question, 101 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1044,
1047 (2009).
226 See Gillick, supra note 224, at 37.
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benefit in cancer treatment and how much cost should factor into
deliberations are not ethical problems that can be relegated to others.
No segment of society is better qualified to address these issues than
' 227

the oncology community."

From the providers' perspectives, this shift clarifies the rules that
govern overtreatment. Instead of basing the investigation on a
Medicare NCD or medical necessity determination, cumulative
overutilization data are easy to quantify and understand. Conversely,
medical necessity determinations are murky in nature 228 and are made
all the more complicated by the subjectivity of medical practice. 229 As

has been noted, "[providers frequently shoulder the burden of
unclear or potentially invalid coverage policy positions in an NCD or
LCD." 230 Eliminating these potentially confusing scenarios would

seem to benefit all involved.
Within this new construct, the likelihood of a provider who
administered clinically-beneficial care and practiced in an acceptable
manner drawing an overtreatment investigation - solely because she
failed to administer care in accordance with a reimbursement standard
- would likely evaporate. Relatedly, such a framework would allow
the medical community to fully engage in a more flexible and organic
growth of medical practice without fear of a DOJ investigation.
Freeing providers of these concerns would allow them to develop and
improve clinical care and to innovate without worry of a DOJ
investigation. Nevertheless, if that innovation involves sustained
increased utilization, they cannot outpace their peers by a substantial
amount.
Finally, patients exposed to this new regulatory framework may
expect to experience better clinical care as a result. Besides ultimately
seeking to limit the global cost of care by cutting unnecessary services,
this new regime would provide a disincentive for the provider to
overuse health care services on a particular patient. Indeed, any time a
231
patient is administered care that is unnecessary, she is harmed.
227

Fojo & Grady, supra note 225, at 1047.

See Brooks E. Allen, Note, The Price of Reform: Cost-Sharing Proposals for the
Medicare Home Health Benefit, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 137, 164 (2000) (noting that "the
medical 'necessity' of a given procedure is unclear where the objectives of medical
efficacy and cost-effectiveness conflict"); see also Anthony Szczygiel, Long Term
Coverage: The Role of Advocacy, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 721, 723 (1996) (calling medical
necessity determinations "subjective").
229 See Sandra H. Johnson, Test-Driving "Patient-CenteredHealth Law," 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1475, 1477 (2010) (noting the subjectivity in medical practice).
230 Blanchard, supra note 92, at 615.
231 See Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation
228
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Publicizing Utilization and Cost Data

In the current paradigm, physicians and commentators have referred
232
to health care fraud regulation as a modern-day "speakeasy."
Indeed, authors have equated the regulation of health fraud to a sign
that says "'No Speeding,' but it does not say what the speed limit is,"233
234
and a regulatory structure characterized by irregularity and overuse.
Settlement press releases from the DOJ are peppered with similar
statements from providers - typically noting that they did not know
they were doing anything wrong, that they still believe in the
appropriateness of the care they administered, and that they settled
simply to avoid the expense of trial.235
Publicizing the utilization and cost data of each provider, in real
time, would remove the potential for surprise when a notice of
investigation appears in providers' mailboxes. Allowing providers to
know where they stand in comparison with others would allow them
to adjust their behavior accordingly. Just the act of publicizing the
data may shame some providers into at least being conscious of the
amounts they are costing Medicare. Nevertheless, whether the
providers ultimately change their behavior or not, this would give the
DOJ backing when providers respond to allegations that "they had no
idea" the care they were administering was wasteful or abusive.
Providing notice in this way would allow providers who care to
avoid an investigation to change their behavior before full
investigatory resources are expended by the DOJ. Conversely, it would
illuminate those providers who - even after knowing they are outside
of the mainstream of providers continue to administer
overtreatment. This fact, by itself, may suffice to show that the
providers were reckless in the administration of care.
B.

Regulatory Advantages

Apart from the structural changes, there are regulatory advantages
to this new construct of overtreatment regulation. The developments
mentioned below feature behavioral self-adjustment by the physician

as a Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 90 (2011) ("These [unnecessary] procedures
also expose patients to unnecessary risks because the practice guidelines conclude
there is no benefit in such cases ....
Unnecessary care that lacks therapeutic benefit is
presumptively poor quality care.").
232 See Hyman, supra note 50, at 550.
233 Blanchard, supra note 92, at 600.
234 See Buck, Enforcement Overdose, supra note 25, at 263-64.
235 See Buck, Caring Too Much, supra note 23, at 505-07.
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at issue, leading to a more efficient regulatory regime. As a result of
the shift of overtreatment regulation from medical-necessity-based
initiatives to focusing on those providers administering excess care,
the DOJ and other regulators would force the medical profession, and
specifically, the treating physician, to internalize these utilizationlimiting values.
Indeed, up to this point within Medicare reimbursement policy, as
well as health care fraud enforcement, it is the failure to force the
provider to adjust his or her behavior that has prevented CMS and the
DOJ from substantially bending the cost curve. With the number of
beneficiaries within the program expected to balloon in the near
future, it is evidently clear that the program must look at ways to limit
cost growth. Regulatory advantages from the new construct of
overtreatment provide enforceable and clear rules without incurring
additional regulatory expense.
1. Flexible Persuasion
Due to the use of accumulated data, providers would not have the
care associated with every procedure they administered or every
patient they treated scrutinized. Within this new regime, providers
could still administer additional procedures to patients they know
need the additional procedures, but doing so to patients too often may
cause that provider to be a "high utilizer" over the course of a year.
Notably, this pressure would not force a provider to choose less care
in any particularcase - which would allow the solution to steer clear
of Medicare's statutory prohibition to stay out of the practice of
medicine. 236 Nevertheless, it may encourage providers - when
deciding whether to place the extra stent or administer the
combination CT scan, for example - to at least be aware of, and more
deliberative about, that decision. Perhaps they would choose less care
more often than they currently do. This would force "loose," not
draconian, utilization-conscious decision-making at the bedside.
Such a move would track - and seek to build on and resuscitate the attempt at cost control through Medicare's sustainable growth rate
("SGR") formula.237 Enacted in 1997, the SGR required that for the
amount the reimbursement per patient outpaced the GDP growth, the
following year, the reimbursement rate would decrease by that exact

See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW:
(7th ed. 2013).
236

237
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amount. 238 Thus based upon the amount providers either overcharged
or undercharged Medicare, the following year's reimbursement
formula would be affected.
The SGR, however, has never gotten off the ground. Feeling little
individual responsibility, physicians have not changed their behavior
to avoid the "punishment" of declining rates. 239 Congress has
exacerbated the problem by passing a "doc fix" nearly all the years
since, undoing the cuts. 240 The result has been a widening gulf
between what should be the reimbursement rate under the SGR
formula and what currently the actual rate is.
Ultimately, the problem with the SGR formula has tracked the age24
old tragedy of the commons; the SGR did not impact individuals. '
No provider has had a personal stake in the benchmarks that Congress
was purportedly requiring providers to meet because no one provider
was punished for the collective excess each year that resulted. 242 And
as Congress repealed the SGR formula year after year, individual
providers' fear of negative effects increasingly declined. 243 Reforming
the overtreatment regime to (1) clearly publicize the metric the DOJ is
using for enforcement, (2) use a standard based on an individual
provider's data on utilization, and (3) ensure swift and appropriate
enforcement of the standard, seeks to avoid the pitfalls experienced by
the SGR framework over the last fifteen years.

238 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4503, 111 Stat. 251, 433
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(f) (2012)).
239 Cf. FURROW ET AL., supra note 237, at 290 ("[The SGR process ignores] the
collective action problem.").
240 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(f); Mary Agnes Carey, Congress Is Poised to Change
Medicare Payment Policy. What Does That Mean for Patients and Doctors?, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 16, 2014), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/congress-doc-fixsustainable-growth-rate-sgr-legislation/; William "Bill" Frist & Steven Schroeder, OpEd., Fix the "Doc Fix" Once and For All, THE HILL (Sept. 24, 2014, 7:00 AM EDT),
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/218665-fix-the-doc-fix-once-and-for-all (noting that
2002 was the only year in which the SGR formula was applied without congressional
intervention).
241 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 237, at 290.
242 See Thomas L. Greaney, Controlling Medicare Costs: Moving Beyond Inept
Administered Pricing and Ersatz Competition, 6 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 229,
237 (2013) ("This approach ignored the patient collective action problem: there was
simply no reason for an individual physician to reduce the volume of services based
on a net reduction in per service payment levels nationally or even regionally.").
243 Cf. FURROW ET AL., supra note 237, at 290-91 (noting that Congress's "'doc fix'
has been stymied").
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Increasing Accuracy

In the current environment, the regulation of overtreatment is
subject to prosecutorial discretion, squeezed by the pressures of using
investigatory dollars in the right places. This constraint is exacerbated
by the inherently subjective nature of the harm at issue and the
dependence on clinical expertise of many of the investigations. 244 As a
result, many overtreatment investigations are an outgrowth of a
relator's lawsuit under the FCA. Catching the eye of an Assistant U.S.
Attorney, often allegations initially brought in an FCA complaint grow
into nationwide initiatives, allowing the DOJ to achieve multiple
settlements and make headlines, while basing their initial facts and
early allegations on a relator's complaint. But regulating overtreatment
in this way opens the regime up to distortion.245
Simply due to the structure and comparative ease of enforceability of
the FCA, the DOJ may limit the universe of potential targets when it
relies on a relator's complaint to illuminate providers engaged in
potential overutilization. Additionally, because some nationwide
initiatives may feature cases that are easier to achieve settlement, or
because some may grab more headlines, it may not be the case that the
"worst actors" are drawing the focus of the government attorneys;
reliance on prosecutorial discretion opens up the regime to
overenforcement and disorder. As a result, for some current
investigations, it may be the case that the providers targeted by an
overtreatment-based health care fraud investigation are actually not
among the most abusive or wasteful for the Medicare program. In this
way, the overtreatment enforcement regime appears to be playing out
in a counterproductive way.
Instead, linking overtreatment regulation to the actual numbers of
utilization for each provider scrubs the framework of any allegation of
unevenness. Indeed, those who are the largest outliers - likely those
costing the program the most - will be the first targets in a new
overtreatment regime. And without question, all providers engaged in
care that substantially departs from their peers' rates could be targeted
with an investigation. This shift evens the playing field, allowing
government attorneys to compare utilization to utilization, provider to
provider, instead of disparate procedures, harms, and costs. Further,
refocusing the regime's targets on those who administer the most
procedures per patient per year - instead of those who allegedly
administered medical care that was not medically necessary - allows
244

See Buck, Enforcement Overdose, supra note 25, at 296.

245 See id. at 293-94.
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the regime to take advantage of the major "regulatory bonus" of
"cascaded retreat,"' 246 which is discussed below.
3.

"Cascaded Retreat"

In the new construct, overtreatment regulation could take advantage
of a regulatory bonus known as "cascaded retreat," an enforcement
phenomenon that would cost the regulators no additional resources in
policing and preventing overutilization. In their seminal work,
Professors Margaret Lemos and Alex Stein argue for what they call
"strategic enforcement" of a legal regime. 247 Under this type of regime,
law enforcers focus on the worst violators, "tolera[ting] ... small-time
infringers so long as they stay away from the 'worst' category." 248
Importantly, a strategic enforcement mechanism "produces a socially
beneficial dynamic - a cascaded retreat from high-end violations that allows law enforcers to economize on enforcement costs while
avoiding the distortions associated with the conventional models."

249

This new model deters individuals from becoming the worst offenders
in a legal regime, and due to "self-adjusting comparative
identification," the "crucial" and cheap "cascaded retreat" results. 250
This means that because the regulated party is aware that he is an
outlier - for instance, a provider who places stents at three times
more often than do his peers - he adjusts his behavior to come back
toward the average, or standard, of his peers, so as not to stand out to
regulators.
In order to illustrate their point, Lemos and Stein provide an
example of strategic enforcement in an accessible example: speeding
down a highway.251 Instead of pulling over every vehicle with a driver
that is speeding, police "stop only those cars whose speed is
conspicuously above the limit." 252 Those driving down the highway

"become motivated not to drive their cars conspicuously fast" because:
(1) the drivers do not know what the "conspicuously above" value is
in a given context; (2) that criterion "varies from one case to another;"

246 See Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV. 9,

18 (2010).
247

See id. at 11-13.

248

251

Id. at 18.
Id.
See id. at 19.
See id. at 9.

252

Id.

249
250
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and (3) police keep the "criterion unannounced."' 253 This causes
speeding drivers to adjust down to the pack. As the authors note,
"[the benefit from not being an outlier will motivate every driver to
slow down. This speed-reduction process will stop at a point at which
254
the driver becomes confident about other drivers' prevalent speed."
Most speeding drivers' slowdowns will be "significant," and "[mlost
important, this social benefit will be achieved at an affordable cost." 255
No additional regulators are needed to enforce the speed limit; the rule
is effectively internalized by the drivers.
Applying their insight to health care administration and delivery,
this new construct of overtreatment regulation would clearly take
advantage of the regulatory benefit of "self-adjusting comparative
identification," and "cascaded retreat." 256 Just like the drivers who are
speeding in the fastest car on a roadway know that they are the driving
faster than their peers, under this new regime, outlying providers
would be aware that they are outliers. By adjusting the enforcement
mechanism so as to target them simply for being excess utilizers, the
regime would quite immediately and directly incentivize them to
adjust their behavior back to the pack.
Indeed, as it stands now, providers who administer care that is
arguably medically necessary have a clinical defense against a health
fraud investigation. For example, the cardiologists at NOHC - even a
target that outpaced the nationwide average on stent placement by
multiples - argued that they were simply "aggressive."' 257 Medicare's
recognition of their clinical autonomy forces the regulatory regime to
pause, or at least hesitate, pondering the legitimacy of the DOJ's health
fraud investigation. When the metric is based on overutilization,
compared to their peer providers, there is no clear clinical defense that
exists to muddy the analysis. It may be the case that providers were
aggressive or different, but it is also undeniably the case that they are
utilization outliers - contributing in a real way to the cost crisis
within Medicare.
V.

LEGAL AND PRACTICAL DEFENSIBILITY

Notably, this new proposal aligns with guidance recently published
by the Office of Inspector General within the Department of Health
253

Id.

254

Id.
Id.

255
256
257

See id. at 19.
See discussion supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
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and Human Services ("OIG"). 258 Based upon a review of providers
responsible for "high cumulative payments," the recent report
envisioned the creation of particular benchmarks; in it, the OIG
suggests that providers billing above a certain standard threshold be
targeted for automatic bill review by CMS. 25 9 It specifically
recommends that "[CMS] establish a cumulative payment threshold
taking into consideration costs and potential program integrity
benefits - above which a clinician's claims would be selected for
review and implement a procedure for timely identification and review
of clinicians' claims that exceed the cumulative payment threshold." 260
This conclusion was based upon a review of 303 clinicians who billed
more than $3 million through Medicare Part B.26 1 More than a third
(104 in total) were identified as receiving "improper payment," and a
total of $34 million in overpayments were found. 262 In response, CMS
"partially concurred" with both recommendations, and noted it would
"work with its contractors to research and develop an appropriate
cumulative payment threshold that considers costs and potential
benefits when determining which claims and providers should be
263
selected for review."
Echoing but expanding the OIG's suggestions, this proposal's new
construct should shift many of the arguments away from medical
necessity, clinical discretion, and scientific debate, and toward
utilization totals, cost totals, and comparative research with
colleagues. Overtreatment regulation could become one of very few
true price controls on the providers' clinical decision-making within
the Medicare program. That the OIG and CMS are already looking into
benchmarking suggests that shifting the DOJ's overtreatment
enforcement regime may have support from within the federal
agencies tasked with overseeing the Medicare program.

258

See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,

A-01-11-

00511, REVIEWS OF CLINICIANS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH CUMULATIVE PAYMENTS COULD
IMPROVE
MEDICARE
PROGRAM
INTEGRITY
EFFORTS
5 (2013), available at

https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/regionl/1 1100511 .pdf.
259 See id.
260

Id.

261 See id. at 3; see also Mike Voorheis, 2 Wilmington Doctors Likely to Have
Medicare Reimbursements Scrutinized, WILMINGTON STAR NEWS (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20140409/ARTICLES/140409641 (noting that
four of the twelve providers with the most money received from Medicare locally were
ophthalmologists).
262 See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 258, at 3.
263 Id. at 5.
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From a general regulatory perspective, Medicare does have power to
establish prophylactic rules without running afoul of the Medicare
statute. Indeed, HHS's authority to enforce prophylactic rules to ease
the administrative burden on the agency has been judicially
endorsed. 264 By way of example, courts have repeatedly upheld 42
C.F.R. § 413.17, which bars the "reimbursement of presumptively
unreasonable costs" specifically, those between related
organizations. 265 In barring these payments, the HHS has made a
"judgment that the probability of abuse in transactions between
related organizations is significant enough that it is more efficient to
prevent the opportunity for abuse from arising than it is to try to
detect actual incidents of abuse."2 66 In other words, courts have noted
that, "[plarticularly in a program as complex and ripe with potential
for abuse as Medicare, the Secretary has broad discretion to control
excessive costs by adopting general prophylactic rules which, despite
their inherent imprecision, eliminate the need for a cumbersome and
expensive process of adjudicating item-by-item the reasonableness of
costs."

267

Consequently, the likelihood of abusive relationships and

resulting excess costs justify HHS taking rather blunt measures. Just
like the prophylactic rule barring payment for related agencies, this
proposal seeks to end the administrative burden of reviewing and
investigating all bills on a claim-by-claim basis while using Medicare's
medical necessity or NCD standard; instead, bills incurred from
providers who are outliers - again, administering care at substantially
higher rates than their peers - could be deemed presumptively
unreasonable.
A.

Fraud-BasedLegal Theories

Under this new construct, the enforcement argument shifts. The
DOJ's strategy moves from arguing that the federal government paid
for something for which it should not have initially paid, to arguing
that the federal government was harmed by a cumulative amount of
care -

based on the number of patients seen or dollars charged -

by

a particular provider. The misconduct results from the excess.
Given prevailing arguments under the FCA, the DOJ would be
arguing that cumulative excessive care is "unreasonable" within the
264 See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Rogers, No. 1:97CV461, 2001 WL 818160, at
*13 (E.D. Tenn. June 28, 2001) (citing judicial support for the prophylactic rule).
265

See id.

266

See Biloxi Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 345, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Marina Mercy Hosp. v. Harris, 633 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1980).

267
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meaning of the Medicare statute. Like it does in current cases, 268 the
DOJ and HHS will be continuing to pursue "unreasonable" care under
a new overtreatment construct; government attorneys will simply be
arguing that different proof - a substantial divergence between the
targeted provider's utilization rate and that of his similarly-situated
peers - demonstrates the "unreasonableness" of the care. In this way,
this proposal does nothing to change the underlying legal argument;
just like current theory, when the provider or entity certifies that the
care administered is "reasonable" on the CMS Form-1500, this
certification would be allegedly "false," based upon this cumulative
annual data reflecting clinical patterns. 269 In addition to the "false"
certification, two additional existing legal theories could provide
appropriate housing for the new construct of overtreatment
regulation: (1) worthless services theory; and (2) "cost plus" fraud
theory. Both are explored below.
1. A New Species of Worthless Services
In the mid-1990s, federal prosecutors devised a bold new theory in an
effort to pursue nursing homes that were administering substandard
care. 270 Recognized in multiple federal courts, 271 the theory submitted
that whenever a clinic or provider billed Medicare for procedures that
were grossly substandard, the government was defrauded because it was
paying for care that was so substandard it was actually worthless. And
by billing Medicare and Medicaid for something that was worthless,

268

See, e.g.,

DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE

2013, at 41
(2014), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/FY2013-hcfac.pdf
(noting that a nursing home settled fraud allegations that allegedly "caused the
submission of false claims to Medicare and Medicaid for medically unreasonable and
unnecessary rehabilitation therapy." In the case, "unreasonable" describes scenarios in
which therapists were "pressured ... to increase the amount of therapy provided to
patients in order to meet targets for Medicare revenue that were set without regard to
patients' individual therapy needs").
269 As it is not setting reimbursement policy, the Hays decision does not prohibit
the DOJ from pursuing providers who administer "unreasonable" items or services.
See Hays v. Sebelius, 589 F.3d 1279, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
270 See Buck, Caring Too Much, supra note 23, at 486-87.
271 See United States ex rel. Swan v. Covenant Care, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212,
1221 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (recognizing worthless services claim, but ultimately denying
it); United States ex rel. Aranda v. Cmty. Psychiatric Ctrs. of Okla., Inc., 945 F. Supp.
1485, 1488 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (recognizing wide liability for substandard care).
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clinics - particularly nursing homes that were neglecting their patients
- were committing health care fraud. 272
This new construct of overtreatment regulation adopts the mantle of
the worthless services theory, and extends it slightly. Like the nursing
home worthless services cases, the argument here is that when the
federal government is billed for services that are worthless - that is,
services that are both above and beyond what is required to meet the
standard of care and result in no health improvement of beneficiaries it is defrauded. Using Dempsey as an example, by allegedly
administering combination scans to nearly 50% of patients that
presented with a chest condition and outpacing the national average of
5%, 45% of the patients who presented to Dempsey received a worthless
combination scan. Doctrinally, it seems as though there is no difference
between a nursing home that administers such substandard care that the
care is worthless and a hospital and/or provider that administers clearly
excessive procedures that are also clinically worthless. Both cases result
in unnecessary loss to the government payer.
2.

"Cost Plus" Fraud

A second doctrinal solution focuses on defense procurement fraud.
Indeed, the federal government has pursued those engaged in defense
procurement fraud (also called "cost plus" fraud) - third parties who
enter into agreements with the federal government, most typically the
U.S. Department of Defense - to perform services and/or provide
items to the government. 273 "Cost plus" fraud occurs when the third
party and the federal government are in a "cost plus" contract, defined
as a contract in which the government reimburses the third party
based upon the amount of costs that the third party incurred in
performing the service or manufacturing the item "plus a fee for the
contractor's services and profit." 274 Unsurprisingly, a "cost plus"
contract may be "dangerous" for a contracting party. 275 Notably, it
"provide[s] little incentive for the contractor to control or minimize
costs" and one with "a fee based on a percentage of the costs creates an
incentive for the contractor to increase costs, thereby increasing the
See Buck, Caring Too Much, supranote 23, at 487-88.
See Randall H. Wintory, Cost-Plus Contracts: Fair Deal or License to Steal?, VA.
LAW., Oct. 2006, at 34, 34-36, available at http://www.vsb.org/docs/
valawyermagazine/wintory v1l006.pdf; False Claims Act: Common Types of Fraud 272

273

Defense Contractor Fraud, ALL-ABOUT-QUI-TAM.ORG,

fcadefense.shtml (last visited July 14, 2014).
274 See Wintory, supra note 273, at 34.
275 See id.

http://www.allaboutquitam.org/

20151

Breaking the Fever

1313

contractor's profits." 276 As such, these contract types are "especially
277
vulnerable to the imposition of illegitimate charges."
The "cost plus" regime is an apt legal analog to Medicare Part B
reimbursement for a number of reasons. Most specifically,
participating providers, like contractors in "cost plus" contracts, have
a clear incentive to increase costs, and to overuse health care services,
as the particular provider's profit increases as the cost to the
contracting party (the federal government) increases. Similarly, the
Medicare reimbursement framework is susceptible to "illegitimate
charges" - and to a substantial amount of fraud, abuse, and
unnecessary care. 278 Like third-party contractors, providers have little

incentive to minimize costs and limit utilization; given the
reimbursement framework, they actually have an incentive to increase
utilization.
The DOJ has applied the FCA to "cost plus" fraud; specifically, the
DOJ has used the FCA to pursue contractors who have allegedly
engaged in "cost plus" scams. 279 In a recent FCA case, a relator alleged
that supervisors ordered employees "to bill time spent on trim pieces
for fixed-price contract planes to cost-plus contract planes or to bill
for unnecessary trim work." 280 Lockheed Martin Corporation, the
defendant, then allegedly "submitted these consolidated charges in its
bills to the government to hide these practices." 281 Finally, according
to the court, these moves "created the appearance that Lockheed was
able to meet its obligations under its fixed-price contracts, while
concealing increased profits via fraudulent bills for its "cost plus"
contracts." 28 2 The court referred to the fraud as a "padded billing
scheme." 283 Denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court
noted that the relator's allegations "provide detailed factual indicia of
276

Id.

277 Robert Bowman, Companies Are Failing to Detect Financial Fraud in Supply
Chains: Deloitte, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2014, 5:59 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/

robertbowman/2014/04/16/companies-are-failing-to-detect-financial-fraud-in-supplychains-deloitte/.
278 See Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in US Health
Care, 307 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1513, 1513 (2012) (documenting the millions lost to
wasted care and fraud and abuse in American health care); Cosgrove et al., supra note
29, at 5 (noting high incidences of unnecessary medical care in the United States).
279 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Harris v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 905 F. Supp. 2d
1343 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (arguing the FCA applies to "cost plus" fraud).
280 See id. at 1347.
281 Id. at 1348.
282 Id.
283

Id.
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reliability to plausibly support [relator's] claim that Lockheed
knowingly presented false claims for payment to the United States
government and false certifications regarding the records that would
84
be material to approval of payment of these false claims."2
In another case, the contractor had to demonstrate the
"reasonability" of its fees to avoid FCA liability. 285 Indeed, in "cost

plus" contracts, where the "aggregate cost upon the face of the account
is so excessive and unreasonable as to suggest gross negligence or
fraud, the law would impose upon the contractor the duty of
286
establishing the bona fides of his performance of the work."
Impliedly, where those fees are unreasonable or deceptive, an FCA
action could lie.
Similar to the imposition of the FCA against Lockheed Martin, the
argument that the DOJ's attorneys can employ focuses on the fact that
the government was defrauded because it was overcharged based upon
overutilization of medical care over the course of a year. Parallel to the
"cost plus" fraud cases, where the federal government can demonstrate
excess and unreasonable utilization that led to excess profits for the
participating provider, the FCA should be applicable.
Within this new construct, from the DOJ's perspective, it should be
of no matter whether each artery that received a stent was sufficiently
occluded, but instead, it is whether, holistically, over the course of the
year, the provider simply placed too many stents that cost the
government too much money. Like "cost plus" fraud, if a provider
exceeds a comparative benchmark of other similarly-situated
providers, it can be said that he has allegedly engaged in a "padded
billing scheme" - which would catch the attention of the DOJ, and
should draw an overtreatment investigation.

Id. at 1353-54.
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 803 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 19 F.3d 770 (2d Cir.
1994) (analyzing the reasonability of the costs). But see, e.g., United States ex rel. Laird
v. Lockheed Martin Eng'g & Sci. Servs. Co., 491 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2007) (refusing to
recognize the applicability of the FCA to a future price bid).
286 See Hitt v. Smallwood, 133 S.E. 503, 506 (Va. Spec. Ct. App. 1926) (dismissing
a fraud claim based on excess cost because the "law does not and cannot standardize
the cost of work"). Indeed, modem reimbursement of Medicare can be differentiated
from the facts of the Hitt case, as for sure, Medicare has "standardized the cost of the
work" - it is simply about overutilization.
284
285

20151

Breaking the Fever
B.

1315

PracticalDetails

By using the profession's standard of care, this proposal advocates
for an effective importation of some characteristics of the medical
malpractice regime by requiring providers to comply with a
profession-based standard or face liability, this proposal pushes fraud
enforcement to look a little more like medical malpractice regulation.
As a result, a regulatory framework that mirrors the regulation of
medical malpractice must be prepared for the critique and challenges
the come with that regime. Notes that recognize these challenges, and
offered brief solutions, are below.
1.

Addressing Clinical Variation

In basing liability on peer behavior, attorneys at the DOJ must be
aware of the challenges presented by the "two schools of thought"
doctrine in medical malpractice, the nationwide and regional clinical
variation between similar providers, and the concern known as
"industry capture" in moving toward a peer-based standard. All three
challenges are species of how best to handle clinical variation, and all
are briefly summarized below.
First, the "two schools of thought" doctrine within medical
malpractice litigation "provides an absolute defense ... when a
physician has chosen one medically acceptable course of action over
alternative treatments that enjoy the support of other medical
experts." 287 In medical malpractice cases, this doctrine - which is also
called the "respectable minority" doctrine 288 excuses clinical
variation for acceptable administered care. Indeed, in implementing
the new overtreatment construct, it is vital that the DOJ not impose
liability in an effort to globally homogenize medical care; instead,
various and different procedures may be offered, and it is the
overutilizers within those classes of providers, within a various
procedure, that should be the targets of overtreatment investigation.
Further, in these overtreatment cases, the allegation focuses on the
fact that the provider administering overtreatment is not administering
an acceptable treatment; indeed, the allegation is that the excess care is
not only wasteful, but harmful.

287 Joan P. Dailey, Comment, The Two Schools of Thought and Informed Consent
Doctrines in Pennsylvania: A Modelfor Integration, 98 DICK. L. REV. 713, 713 (1994).
288 See Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking
Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 704 (2002).
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Second, on a related note, a comparative regime must take into
account regional variation among providers; indeed, interregional
clinical standards can vary substantially. 289 Nevertheless, the NOHC,
for example, was administering clearly excessive angioplasties whether compared to cardiologists nationwide or just in Ohio. Again,
the prosecutors must take care to account for the real regional
differences among various providers and limit their focus to those who
substantially exceed the prevailing standard of peer providers in
cohesive geographic areas.
Finally, such a new regulatory structure must account for the fact
that providers, emboldened to determine the standard of care, may
globally adjust upward the amount of care they administer.
Accordingly, this new framework does not prevent the DOJ, or CMS
for that matter, from setting some sort of range-based standard or
limitation as to what is "acceptable." Providers within a so-called
acceptable range, as compared to other providers, would not be
targeted for an investigation. Instead of simply trusting the profession
that providers are acting in the best interests of their patients and
being satisfactory stewards of taxpayer dollars, 290 the DOJ can target
those providers who compare unfavorably to their peers beyond some
acceptable amount, so as not to cede too much regulatory power to the
profession.
Indeed, this regulatory strategy would depend on the reasonability
of the providers in setting the standard; this assumes that most
providers would not attempt to "game" the standard, nor administer
unnecessary health care services. Nevertheless, the DOJ could retain
289

See

CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL Scis., DARTMOUTH MED. SCH.,

THE

DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE 1998, at 114 (John E. Wennberg & Megan

McAndrew Cooper eds., 1998), available at http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
downloads/atlases/98Atlas.pdf (noting that "variation in rates of CABG [coronary
artery bypass grafting] across geographic regions suggests that physicians have
different symptom 'thresholds' for recommending surgery"); see also James F.
Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well Is It Doing in Assuring Quality,
Accounting for Costs, and Coping with an Evolving Reality in the Healthcare
Marketplace?, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 125, 136 (2002) (observing "unexplained
variations in medical practice across geographic regions"); Jamie Staples King &
Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for Shared Medical
Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 446 (2006) (noting the "evidence of wide
geographic variation in treatment practices and variance between physicians on
information disclosure").
290 This suggestion contemplates the fact that without CMS's medical necessity
standard as a benchmark, all providers would inflate the amount of care they
administer, causing the subspecialty-based peer comparison to fail to provide a
sufficient check on the billing and utilization patterns of providers.
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discretion to impose a "snapshot" range of standards to prevent an
inflation of the standard. Additionally, these standards could be linked
to the previous year's rates - with a defined and limited increase
allowed - preventing the profession from ballooning the number of
procedures administered from year to year. However, in some ways, in
an effort to ensure that expertise drives regulation, providers'
standards must control here.
2.

Focusing on the Big Utilizers

It is clear that a reordering of the regulatory structure will likely
result in a change of the targets of the investigation. Particularly, a
more orderly regulatory framework that targets providers who
excessively outpace their similarly situated peers will result in the DOJ
targeting those engaged in excessive overutilization. And, as a result,
the DOJ may not focus its regulatory resources on those engaged in
allegations of minor overutilization. Indeed, "cascaded retreat"
enforcement specifically envisions this phenomenon. 291 Minor
offenders may evade enforcement.
As providers who are the most excessive outliers adjust downward,
however, the hope would be that the DOJ would increasingly target
providers whose utilization rates are less and less striking. On its face,
that the DOJ will target those with the most egregious overutilization
rates could be a positive development for controlling costs and
preventing overtreatment; after all, the top ten Medicare billers in
2012 were responsible for $121 million in annual costs to Medicare. 292
When seeking to punish excessive waste in the system, it only makes
sense for the DOJ to pursue those most likely responsible.
CONCLUSION

Currently dominated by detail-oriented clinical questions,
overtreatment investigations based upon medical necessity and
Medicare's NCDs draw the ire of the clinical community while failing
to produce an authoritative and clear message regarding health care
fraud and abuse. That the investigation comes down to a clinical
marker or characteristic highlights the difficulty government attorneys
experience in regulating overtreatment in an era of increased DOJ antifraud resources. The regulatory challenges, juxtaposed against the

291 See Lemos & Stein, supra note 246, at 19.
292 See Millman, supra note 123.
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direness and immediacy of Medicare's cost crisis, highlight the need
for a more efficient, effective, and calibrated regulatory response.
Indeed, American providers who provide too much expensive care
are in need of real but reasonable pressure to be mindful of the
amount of excessive care they provide. This proposal, which
reconceives of overtreatment regulation as pursuing excess utilizers,
seeks to avoid many of the drawbacks of the current system while
protecting the autonomy of participating providers. It also seeks to
provide a path forward amid substantial current threats to the
Medicare program in an effort to build a legal regime more accurately
aligned with the goals of cost control. And upon implementation,
overtreatment regulation may finally provide a long-awaited and
substantial counterbalance to providers' incentives to constantly
provide more care.
Medicare cannot afford to wait.

